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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

:
: Case No. 920395-CA
: Priority No. 16

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant- Appellant

: District Court

No. 874904967

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to the
provisions of Section 78-2a-3(g) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
This action involves the appeal of an Order Finding Defendant
(Appellant) in Contempt and Imposing Jail Sentence and Judgment
signed and entered June 19, 1992, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

A Notice of

Appeal was filed on June 24, 1992. No cross-appeal has been filed.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Should substantial portions of Dr. Osguthorpe's Brief be

disregarded

because

they

relate

to

events

and

claims which

allegedly occurred after the entry of the Order from which this
appeal is taken?

II.

Did the trial court properly find Dr. Osguthorpe in contempt

of its previous order and impose proper sanctions upon him for such
contempt?

III. Can this Court consider Dr. Osguthorpe!s claim of error
related to an order awarding Mrs. Osguthorpe certain attorney's
fees and costs, when no appeal has been taken in connection with
that order?

IV.

Is Mrs. Osguthorpe

entitled

to

be

awarded

all

of

her

attorney's fees and costs incurred by her in defending this appeal?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
As to those portions of Appellant's Brief which address and
argue events, hearings, incidents, and orders which occurred after
June 19, 1992, the provisions of Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure are controlling and determinative.
Those Rules provide in pertinent part:
RULE 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(1) Filing appeal from final orders and
judgments.
An appeal may be taken from a
district, juvenile, or circuit court to the
appellate court with jurisdiction over the
appeal from all final orders and judgments,
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial
court within the time allowed by Rule 4.
Failure of an appellant to take any step other
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal
2

does not affect the validity of the appeal,
but is ground only for such action as the
appellate court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the
award of attorney fees.
RULE 4.

Appeal as of right: when taken.

(1) Appeal from final judgment and
order.
In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial
court to the appellate court, the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with
the clerk of the trial court within 3 0 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of an Order signed by the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson on June 19, 1992, imposing a jail sentence and judgment
on Appellant.

That Order resulted from an earlier Order dated

January 24, 1992, which was the result of an evidentiary hearing
held on January 7, 1992, where the Respondent requested, among
other things, that the Appellant be held in contempt of the trial
court's prior orders based on the Appellant's
compliance with those orders.

repeated non-

No appeal has been taken from the

January 24, 1992, Findings, Conclusions and Order which made the
original contempt finding. The January 24, 1992, Order stayed the
imposition of sanctions, provided the Appellant pay certain sums
towards his child support obligations. The Appellant failed to do
so, requiring the Respondent to seek imposition of the previously
imposed sanctions. That resulted in a May 18, 1992, hearing where
the trial court determined that Appellant had not satisfied the
earlier requirements to stay imposition of the sanctions.

At the

conclusion of that hearing, an Order was entered which reactivated
the sanctions which had been stayed, but again gave Appellant the
opportunity

to

avoid

imposition

of

the

sanctions

previously

ordered, if certain payments towards past due child support and
alimony were made.

It is from this June 19, 1992, Order that this

appeal is taken.
Appellant, in his Statement of the Case, claims that this is
also "an appeal from the Order of Judge Wilkinson upon remand
awarding attorneyfs fees to the plaintiff as to litigation in the
Utah

Supreme

Court

and

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

the

Federal

District

Court

of

Utah."

That Order was signed and entered on

December 3, 1992. No Notice of Appeal has been filed in connection
with that Order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mrs. Osguthorpe seeks the* following relief from this Court in
connection with Dr. Osguthorpe's appeal:
1)

That the trial court's Findings, Conclusions and Orders

related to Dr. Osguthorpe's contempt be affirmed in all respects.
2)

That Point VI of Dr. Osguthorpe's Brief be disregarded in

its entirety.
3)

That Mrs. Osguthorpe be awarded all of her attorney's

fees and costs related to defending this Appeal.
4)

For such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate

and fair under the circumstances of this case.
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dr. Osguthorpe's Statement of Facts contains allegations of
4

facts not pertinent to this appeal. These begin at page 15 of his
Brief.

Mrs. Osguthorpe

objects

to

the

inclusion

of

those

allegations in his Statement of Facts and respectfully requests
this Court to disregard the same.
Mrs. Osguthorpe will supplement Appellant's Statement of Facts
to the extent necessary so that this Court will have an accurate
historical perspective about the parties and what has transpired
since the parties were divorced in February of 1989.
In addition, Mrs. Osguthorpe has included in the Addendum to
this Brief, copies of the pleadings, Findings and Orders, and
certain Exhibits received at the January 7, 1992, hearing and which
serve as the basis for the trial courts finding of contempt and
imposition of sanctions on Dr. Osguthorpe.
The parties have four children as issue of this marriage,
Jeffrey, age 15; John, age 14; and twins, Julie and Jennifer, age
11.

Under the original Decree, among other things, Dr. Osguthorpe

was ordered to pay to Respondent, Mrs. Osguthorpe, the sum of
$150.00 per month, per child, as and for child support for the
parties1 four minor children, for a total of $600.00 per month,
together with the sum of $150.00 per month alimony for a period of
five years.

At the end of five years, the alimony award was

ordered to be reduced to the sum of $1.00 per year for an
additional five year period, or until such time as Mrs. Osguthorpe
remarried, cohabited or died, whichever of the four events was
first to occur.

(R-272.)

On March 28, 1989, Dr. Osguthorpe filed an appeal of the trial
5

court's ruling on a number of issues, including alimony and child
support.

This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in all

respects and awarded Mrs. Osguthorpe the attorney's fees she
incurred on appeal.

[Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah

App. 1990), a copy of this opinion has been included in the
Addendum to this Brief.]
In its principal opinion, this Court deferred to the trial
court's

assessment

of

witness

credibility

in

finding

that,

"Defendant was not being candid as to his actual current income, or
was purposefully underemployed," and that, "Defendant was either
understating his actual income or had chosen employment which paid
less than he could otherwise* earn."

Osguthorpe at 534.

With

regard to the child support, this Court also deferred to the trial
court's assessment that, "Defendant had an ability to earn more
than he purported to earn and find no abuse of discretion in the
Court's award of child support in accordance with that assessment."
Id. at 535.

Since the Decree, Dr. Osguthorpe has not sought to

modify any provision of the Decree.
In September, 1991, Mrs. Osguthorpe filed Plaintiff's Verified
Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions and Other Relief.
(R-466.)

That Motion came on regularly for hearing before the

Domestic Relations Commissioner on October 8, 1991.
filed an Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation.

Defendant
(R-488.)

Mrs. Osguthorpe then noticed a hearing on Defendant's Objection to
Plaintiff's Written Order and Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of
Divorce,

Contempt

Order, etc., filed
6

January

11, 1991, and

Defendant's Objections to Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations
related to Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Judgment, Contempt
Order, Sanctions, and other relief made October 8, 1991.

This

Motion came on regularly for full evidentiary hearing on January 7,
1992, before Judge Wilkinson. Both sides were present, testified,
called witnesses and introduced documentary evidence.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order and
Judgment from the January 7, 1992, hearing were signed and entered
on January 24, 1992, and have been included in the Addendum to this
Brief.

The trial court found Dr. Osguthorpe in contempt and

ordered him to serve thirty days in the Salt Lake County Jail, but
stayed the jail sentence if, by January 13, 1992, Dr. Osguthorpe
paid $5,000.00 towards the child support arrearages already reduced
to judgment.

The jail sentence was further stayed, provided Dr.

Osguthorpe pay to Mrs. Osguthorpe, in a timely fashion, the sum of
$900.00 per month

($600.00 regular child support and $3 00.00

towards child support arrearages).

If Dr. Osguthorpe did not make

these monthly payments, as ordered, then the stay of the jail
sentence was to be lifted and Dr. Osguthorpe was ordered to
immediately commence serving that sentence. The order allowed Dr.
Osguthorpe to purge himself of this contempt by paying the amounts
he was ordered to pay.

Dr. Osguthorpe paid the $5,000.00, as

ordered by the Court, on January 13, 1992.

However, he did not

make his regular child support payments and payments on the
arrearages as required.
On

(R-589, 590.)

April 30, 1992, Mrs. Osguthorpe filed a Verified Motion
7

for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail
Sentence, a copy of which has been included in the Addendum to this
Brief.

It, together with a Notice of Hearing, was properly served

on Dr. Osguthorpe by mailing to his home and business addresses.
That Motion, among other things, requested that the stay of
sanctions imposed by the January 24, 1992, Order of Contempt be
lifted and that an additional judgment for child support and
alimony not paid by Dr. Osguthorpe between January cind May, 1992,
be entered against him.
Court on May 18, 1992.

(R-588.)

The Motion was heard by the

Both parties were present.

Documentary

evidence was presented by Dr. Osguthorpe and received by the Court.
During the course of that hearing, the trial court stated:
That this matter has already been up before
the Court of Appeals on one occasion, that the
Court sustained this Court, and that the Court
indicated the same as this Court has, that
Defendant's income as stated by him is just
not realistic. The Court of Appeals took the
position that the unknown amounts of income,
that there was an unknown amount of income
that this Court has taken into consideration
and it was justified in doing so, and no
matter how you look at it, we still have
children there that do need to be supported.
(Transcript May 18, 1992, hearing Vol. 2 p.
2.)
A final Order emanating from that hearing was signed and
entered on June 19, 1992. A copy has been included in the Addendum
to this Brief. Pursuant to the terms of this Order, Dr. Osguthorpe
was ordered to be incarcerated in the Salt Lake County jail for a
period of thirty days and such longer time as the Court deemed fit,
if Dr. Osguthorpe failed to pay the sum of $3,050.00 by June 24,
1992, at 12:00 noon. He has failed to make the required payments.

On or about June 24, 1992, Dr. Osguthorpe filed a Motion for
Stay of Jail Sentence in the Utah Court of Appeals.

On that same

day, Judge Russell W. Bench granted a temporary stay, until the
matter could be heard on its merits.
On July 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued its Order
denying the stay and wrote in part as follows:
It is hereby ordered that the motion for stay
pending appeal is denied, and the temporary
stay previously granted is vacated, based upon
the court's determination that appellant has
not sufficiently demonstrated that he would be
likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal.
See Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026, 1027
(Utah App. 1987) (per curiam), and
It is further ordered that the case is
temporarily remanded to the trial court for
determination and entry of an award of
appellee's
costs
and
attorney's
fees
reasonably incurred in opposing the motion for
stay. (Emphasis Added.)
As of the January 7, 1992, hearing, Dr. Osguthorpe owed Mrs.
Osguthorpe over $32,000.00 in unpaid child support, alimony and
attorney's fees.
Brief.)

(See Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5, Addendum to this

As of the May 18, 1992, he had failed to pay $2,550.00 in

child support and alimony, which had accrued between the January
and May hearings.

(R-615.)

During the January 7th hearing, he testified that he was a
doctor of veterinarian medicine, practicing for 15 years, and
earned only $5.00 per hour.
Vol.

II p. 69.)

(Transcript, January 7, 1992, hearing

He acknowledged he understood

all of his

obligations under the original Decree and had not complied with
them.

Id. pp. 56-61.

He said he hadn't paid child support
9

because he hadn't had certain items of personal property returned
to him.

Id. p. 35.

Later, during the hearing, he denied making

that statement. Id. p. 64.

He couldn't recall if he paid child

support in November and December 1991, and January 1992.

Id. p.

62. He couldn't identify a picture of the new $155,000.00 home his
new wife had just purchased in which they were living. (Id. p. 69
and Exhibit 14 Addendum.)
month to live there.

He said he was paying her $500.00 per

Id. p.76.

During the hearing, a tape recording of a conversation he had
had with Mrs. Osguthorpe was listened to and the tape and a
transcript of that conversation was received in evidence. After it
was presented to the trial court, Dr. Osguthorpe denied that he had
said,
God, I thought you were going to have my ass
in jail.(Laughter) Id. p. 74.
(A copy of the transcript is included in the Addendum to this Brief
and the original tape recording is in the Exhibit Envelope for the
January 7, 1992, hearing.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
All

claims, allegations

and

arguments

contained

in Dr.

Osguthorpe's Brief which pertain to anything occurring after June
19, 1992, should be disregarded entirely, these matters not being
properly before this Court in connection with this Appeal.
POINT II
The Appellant's claim of error in relation to the contempt
issue is without merit.

First, the January 1992, Findings and
10

Order giving rise to the contempt
appealed.

citation have never been

This appeal pertains only to the June 1992, Order

imposing the jail sentence after the Appellant had failed to purge
himself of his earlier contempt.

Assuming only for the sake of

argument, that Appellant could challenge the January Order in this
appeal, the evidence presented

at the January

hearing fully

supports the trial court's written findings and satisfies all of
the legal requirements for a finding of contempt.

Further, the

Appellant was afforded the procedural due process requirements
required by the United States and Utah Constitutions as have been
outlined and set forth by the Utah Supreme Court.
POINT III
The Order granting Mrs. Osguthorpe her attorney's fees and
costs incurred in connection with Dr. Osguthorpe's Petition's for
Extraordinary Writ and Writ of Habeas Corpus has not been appealed,
and therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the same.
POINT IV
The points raised by Dr. Osguthorpe on appeal are without
merit.

In addition, his actions throughout the course of this

litigation

reveal motives and attitudes which should

tolerated by the judicial system.
awarded

the

attorney's

fees

and

connection with this appeal.
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not be

Mrs. Osguthorpe should be
costs

she

has

incurred

in

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PORTIONS OF DR. OSGUTHORPE'S BRIEF WHICH
RELATED TO EVENTS AND CLAIMS THAT OCCURRED
AFTER JUNE 24, 1992, SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
BY THIS COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL.
Dr. Osguthorpe filed his Notice of Appeal in this case on June
24, 1992.

(R-632.)

(See Addendum.)

The Appeal was taken from an

Order entered by the lower court on June 19, 1992.

A substantial

portion of Dr. Osguthorpe's brief contains allegations and argument
related to events, hecirings and orders which occurred after the
June 19, 1992, Order.
Orders.

No appeal has been taken from any subsequent

Pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure. those claims and matters are not properly
before this Court and Mrs. Osguthorpe respectfully requests this
Court to disregard
entirety.

all such allegations and argument

in their

(See, Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981), Burgers

v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).)

In addition, no Notice of

Appeal has been filed in relation to the trial court's January 24,
1992, Order and, therefore, any claim of error assigned to this
Order should also be disregarded.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING DR.
OSGUTHORPE IN CONTEMPT OF IT'S PREVIOUS ORDERS
AND IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
IN ALL RESPECTS.
In arguing that the trial court committed reversible error in
finding Dr. Osguthorpe

in contempt and

in imposing sanctions,

Appellant has not clearly explained the nature and outcome of the
12

January 7, 1992, and May 18, 1992, hearings.

Dr. Osguthorpe has

claimed error in findings and orders not appealed from and has
based much of his argument on a period of time which occurred after
his Notice of Appeal of the June 19, 1992, Order was filed. Before
his claims of error regarding the contempt issues can be addressed,
the chronology

and

interrelationship

of the January

and May

hearings must be understood.
In January, a full evidentiary hearing was held on the issue
of Dr. Osguthorpefs contemptuous behavior.

Proper notice of the

hearing was given. (R-543, 544.) Mrs. Osguthorpe1s Motion seeking
a contempt citation, among other things, was verified and set forth
that she was seeking imposition of a jail sentence based upon Dr.
Osguthorpe's repeated violations of prior court orders.
months

before,

after

his

trial

counsel

had

Fourteen

withdrawn, Dr.

Osguthorpe had been given proper notice to retain new counsel or
appear in person. (R-381.)

Since that time, and until June 11,

1992, Dr. Osguthorpe appeared pro se at all hearings, filed
pleadings, objections and other papers with the court on his own
behalf.
At the January hearing both parties appeared. Consistent with
his practice over the prior 14 months, Dr. Osguthorpe represented
himself.

At this hearing he testified, introduced documentary

evidence,

called

his

own

Osguthorpe and her counsel.
closing statements.

witnesses

and

cross-examined

Mrs.

Furthermore, he made opening and

(Transcript January 7, 1992, hearing, Vol.

II.)
13

Also at this hearing, evidence was presented as to Dr.
Osguthorpe's

ability

to

earn

income

and

his

knowledge

and

understanding of his obligations to pay support under the original
Decree.
at

it's

Id. pp. 56-62.
conclusion,

This hearing lasted almost a full day and

the

trial

court

made

its

Findings

and

Conclusions and an Order, all of which were reduced to writing and
not signed until Dr. Osguthorpe had had the proper time to file
objections.
The Findings and Conclusions, ultimately signed and entered on
January 24, 1992, in pertinent part state:
5.

UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.

a.
Defendant has failed to pay child
support and alimony for considerable periods
of time (See plaintiff's Exhibits 2, 3,4 and
5). Between December 1990 and January 1992,
plaintiff owed defendant $8,400 in child
support, $2,100 in cilimony (total $10,500 plus
accrued interest).
Defendant paid $750
leaving an unpaid arrearage of $9,750 (See
plaintiff's Exhibit 5 and $750 owed for
January, 1992.) No chid support has been paid
since February, 1991.
b.
Defendant and his current wife both
testified 'He would pay child support if his
personal items were returned.'
c.
Defendant further testified the
plaintiff had plenty of money and could sell
one of her houses.
d.
Defendant has not demonstrated good
faith in connection with attempting to pay his
ongoing support obligations.
e.
Defendant testified he was paying
his new wife $500 per month rent in order to
reside with her in a home she recently
purchased at 6808 Courtland Circle, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
14

f.
Defendant
is
a
veterinarian
practicing in excess of 15 years and testified
he earned $5,00 per hour in connection with
consultation he claimed he provided to the
Osguthorpe Animal Hospital. Defendant had and
has the means to pay child support.
g.
The credibility of the defendant and
his present wife is lacking. Both refused to
answer questions on the stand.
Both were
evas ive.
The defendant did not answer
questions truthfully.
h.
The defendant's failure to pay his
support obligations as previously ordered was
done willfully, voluntarily and with the full
knowledge of those obligations as previously
ordered by the Court.
6.
CONTEMPT. The Court finds the defendant
is in contempt of this Court pursuant to
Section 78-32-1(5) Utah Code Annotated (1953,
as amended) , in that he has been disobedient
of lawful judgments, orders and processes of
this Court. The defendant had the opportunity
to have a full hearing and evidence has been
taken regarding that contempt. The defendant
has not answered the questions put to him
truthfully. The Court specifically finds that
this is one of the most flagrant violations of
the law as far as support of children that has
come before this Court, in that the Defendant
owes plaintiff in excess of $16,000 in unpaid
child support alone. Defendant is further in
contempt for his failure to pay alimony and
attorney's fees as previously ordered by the
Court. (R-557-559.) (Emphasis added.)
It was from these findings that the trial court entered its
Order of January 24, 1992, sentencing the Defendant to jail, but
also staying that jail sentence provided Dr. Osguthorpe pay certain
sums towards the arrearages.

(R-552.)

The court also gave Dr.

Osguthorpe the opportunity to purge himself of this contempt by
paying the sums required.

(R-553.)

Dr. Osguthorpe never appealed the January 24th Findings,
15

Conclusion and Order.

On that basis alone he is precluded from

claiming any error in connection with that Order in this appeal.
(See Rule 4(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.)
After the hearing, Dr. Osguthorpe not only failed to make the
required monthly payments on the arrearage, but also again did not
make his full regular child support and alimony payment.

He paid

only $1,500.00 on a $3,000.00 obligation between February and May
of 1992.

Because of his failure to make the payments on the

arrearages as required by the January 24th Order, and his failure
to make ongoing support payments, Mrs. Osguthorpe filed a new
Motion seeking judgment on the new arrearages and imposition of the
jail sentence which was imposed under the January 24th Order, but
stayed, provided Dr. Osguthorpe made the required payments.
(R-588-592, See Addendum.)
Dr. Osguthorpe was again given proper notice of this hearing
and he again testified, by way of proffer, and again introduced
documentary evidence.

(Transcript May 18, 1992, hearing, Vol. I.)

During this hearing he admitted he had not paid the amounts
required in order to stay the earlier imposed jail sentence, (Id.
p. 6.) and admitted he had not paid all of his regular ongoing
child support and alimony payments.

(Id. p.7.)

At the conclusion of this second hearing, the Court imposed
the jail sentence which had been stayed in January and gave Dr.
Osguthorpe yet another chance to avoid the jail sentence by
including in its Order:
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However the Court will stay its imposition of
jail sentence, as long as the following
conditions are met: (a) the Court shall stay
this Order until June 24, 1992, at 12:00 noon,
at which time $4,050.00 shall be paid by
Defendant to Plaintiff to bring the delinquent
child support and alimony through June 1992,
($1,800.00 in child support through June 1992,
and alimony of $750.00 through June, 1992;
and attorney's fees of $500.00 for purpose of
these proceedings). If the $3,050.00 is not
paid by June 24, 1992, at 12:00 noon, a bench
warrant shall issue, unless the defendant
submits himself to the Salt Lake County Jail
for incarceration.
(b)
The Court further
orders that if the on-going child support and
payment on arrearages of $900.00 per month due
on the 5th day of July, 1992, is not paid at
that time, a bench warrant shall issue, unless
Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the
Salt Lake County Jail. (R-615.)
And again Dr. Osguthorpe failed to comply.

It was only after

all of this did a Bench Warrant issue for Dr. Osguthorpefs arrest.
Appellant's argument pertaining to the contempt issue can be
distilled into two simple questions.
1)

Was

there

sustainable

sufficient

evidence

and

are

the

Findings

in connection with the contempt

citation

which resulted from the January hearing?
2)

Was

Dr. Osguthorpe

afforded

adequate

procedural

due

process in connection with the finding of contempt made
by the trial court in January 1992?
The answer to the first question is "yes" in both respects.
Throughout the history of this case, Dr. Osguthorpe, a doctor of
veterinarian medicine practicing for over 15 years with his father
Dr.

D. A. Osguthorpe, at the Osguthorpe Veterinary Hospital,

claimed he only made/makes $1,000.00 per month.
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At the initial

divorce trial, the trial court found otherwise concluding that Dr.
Osguthorpe either understated his income or was underemployed.

On

appeal,

v.

this

Court

affirmed

that

finding.

Osguthorpe

Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah App. 1990) . A copy of this case has
been included in the Addendum to this Brief.
Since that time cind continuously through the present, Dr.
Osguthorpe has maintained that same position.

However, simply

because Dr. Osguthorpe says that's the case doesn't mean that his
claim is true.

In fact, in all evidentiary hearings conducted in

this case, the trial court has specifically found to the contrary.
The January

7th hearing

is no

exception.

After

a

full

hearing, the trial court specifically found:
1)

That he said he would pay the child support

ordered if certain personal property was awarded to him;
2)

That he had not acted in good faith in paying his

ongoing child support obligations;
3)

That he had cind has the means to pay child

support;
4)

That he did not answer questions truthfully;

5)

That his failure to pay his support obligations

and

was done willfully, voluntarily and with full knowledge
of those

obligations.

(R-557-559; Addendum

to

this

Brief.)
This Court recently enumerated the elements necessary for a
trial court to find a person in contempt in State v. Hurst. 821
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P.2d 467 (Utah App. 1991), where Judge Greenwood stated:
For the court to hold Hurst in contempt for
failure to comply with a court order, it had
to find that she (1) knew what was required,
(2) had the ability to comply and (3)
intentionally failed to do so. Von Hake v.
Thomas 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). These
elements must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal contempt proceeding, and
by clear and convincing evidence in a civil
contempt proceeding. Id. Hurst, at 471.
Even assuming that this was a criminal contempt proceeding,
that burden was met not only by the language of the Findings
themselves, but also by the statements of Judge Wilkinson when he
issued his order from the bench at the conclusion of the January
hearing.
He (Dr. Osguthorpe) just perjures himself in
this courtroom . . .
He has not answered the questions truthfully
The Court finds that this is one of the most
flagrant violations of the law as far as
support of children that has come before this
court.
(Transcript January 7, 1992, hearing, Vol. Ill
p. 9, 10; parenthetical language added.)
Judge Greenwood, in affirming the trial court's finding of
contempt in the Hurst case goes on to state:
We affirm the trial court's findings and the
conclusions logically flowing therefrom-if the
findings are based on sufficient evidence,
viewing the evidence in the light most
generous to the trial court. West Valley City
v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1312-14
(Utah App. 1991) . We will not set aside a
finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Utah
R. Civ. P. 52(a). We give 'due regard' to the
'opportunity of the trial court to judge the
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credibility of the witnesses. ' Id. To show
insufficiency of the evidence, Hurst is
required to
'marshal all the evidence
supporting the challenged findings and then
show that despite that evidence, the findings
are clearly lacking in support.' (State of
Utah, in the Interest of M.S., 815 P.2d 1325,
1328 (Utah App. 1991).
Rather than marshaling the evidence supporting
the challenged findings, Hurst has restated
only the evidence favorable to her position.
Because she failed to marshal the evidence, we
accept the challenged
finding and the
resulting conclusions. See Majestic Inv., at
1312-14; Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P. 2d 939,
44 (Utah App. 1990). Id. at 471.
In the present case, Dr. Osguthorpe has failed to marshall all
of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then
demonstrate that that evidence was insufficient.

Like Ms. Hurst,

he has attempted only to restate evidence which he thinks is
favorable to his position.

His challenge of the adequacy of the

findings must fail.
Dr. Osguthorpe goes on to argue that the contempt citation in
his case was criminal in nature, however a review of both the
January 24th and June 19th Orders shows that this is not the case
when applying the criteria for civil contempt as established by the
Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake v. Thomas 759 P. 2d 1162 (Utah 1988) .
Justice Zimmerman thoroughly and comprehensively

analyzes the

contempt remedy in Utah and states:
A contempt order is civil if it has a remedial
purpose, either to coerce an individual to
comply with a court order given for the
benefit of another party or to compensate an
aggrieved party for injuries resulting from
the failure to comply with an order. See,
e.g., Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 530
(Utah 1981); Shillitani v. United States, 384
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U.S. 364, 368-70, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1534-36, 16
L.Ed.2d 622 (1966); cf. In re Whitmore. 9 Utah
441, 35 P. 524, 526-29 (1894) (discussing the
differences
between
criminal
and
civil
contempt). It is important to note that it is
the purpose, not the method of the punishment,
that serves to distinguish the two types of
proceedings. Both fines and imprisonment may
be used to coerce a party or remedy a failure
to perform as well as to vindicate a court's
authority.
See Bradshaw, 627 P.2d at 53 0;
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-32-10 to -12 (1987). One
distinguishing factor is whether the fine or
sentence is conditional. A remedial purpose
is indicated when the contemner is allowed to
purge him-or herself of the contempt by
complying with the court's orders. Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68, 68 S.Ct. 401, 407, 92
L.Ed. 476 (1948); see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3212 (1987) (allowing conditional imprisonment).
Id. at 1168. (Emphasis added.)
This distinction was also discussed and acknowledged by this
Court in Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991), when
Judge Jackson analyzed the nature of a contempt citation that had
been made against a husband in a divorce proceeding.
Husband's imprisonment was unconditional. He
was not permitted any opportunity to remedy or
purge himself of the alleged contempt. Thus,
the principal purpose of the judgment was to
punish rather than obtain compliance with
prior orders. Accordingly, the judgment was
criminal in nature and appealable.
Id. at
1168; Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121
(Utah 1977.) Id.
Both the January and June Orders were remedial

in nature

because they provided Dr. Osguthorpe with a way of avoiding the
jail sentence and contempt citation by simply making the child
support payments required by the Court.

In fact, the January 24th

Order, the only Order which should be analyzed in connection with
the contempt issue, specifically states:
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(g) Defendant may purge himself of his
contempt as has been found by the Court by
paying the amounts required in a Paragraph's
(e) and (f) above. (R-553.)
Clearly, the contempt citation before the court falls within
the civil contempt definition established in Von Hcike, and Boggs
supra. Dr. Osguthorpe's argument that this is a criminal contempt
citation is without merit.
Secondly, the

adequacy

and propriety

January

24, 1992,

Findings and Order, are not sxibject to challenge because no appeal
has ever been taken from the same. Based upon that fact alone, no
consideration should be given to any of Dr. Osguthorpe's argument
attempting to challenge the contempt finding.

[See Boggs at 481

and Utah R.App. p.3(a).]
Turning now to the second question raised by Dr. Osguthorpe
regarding the adequacy of procedural due process, that argument
must likewise fail based upon the Utah Supreme Court decision of
Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) which was relied on
and cited with approval in the Von Hake and Boggs cases supra. In
Burgers,

the

Defendant

violated

a

permanent

injunction

and

consequently, the trial court found him in contempt based upon the
evidence and his own admissions and sentenced him to- serve 3 0 days
in jail.

On appeal, the Defendant claimed, among other things,

that he was imprisoned without due process of law. In addressing
and ultimately rejecting that claim, the Court stated:
The defendant claims that he was denied
due process in the order to show cause hearing
held June 30, 1991. Both this Court and the
United States Supreme Court have held that an
individual's constitutional rights must be
22

protected during a contempt of court action.
Thus, in a prosecution for contempt, not
committed in the presence of the court, due
process requires that the person charged be
advised of the nature of the action against
him, have assistance of counsel, if requested,
have the right to confront witnesses, and have
the right to offer testimony on his behalf.
See, In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499,
92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Cooke v. United States,
267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767
(1925); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 118, 378
P.2d 519 (1963); Robinson v. City Court of
Oaden, supra.
In the present case, the defendant was
given notice of the contempt charge against
him when he was served with a copy of the
order to show cause. The defendant appeared
as his own counsel and offered testimony on
his behalf. From an examination of the trail
court transcript, it is clear that the trial
court
never
denied
the
defendant
the
opportunity to confront adverse witnesses or
call witnesses on his own behalf.
On the
contrary,
the
defendant
himself
never
requested to confront or call a witness. Id.
at 1322. (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, Dr. Osguthorpe received proper notice of
the hearing and the fact that Mrs. Osguthorpe was requesting
imposition of a jail sentence. He appeared. Almost a full day of
evidence was presented.

He never requested counsel.

opening and closing statements.
witnesses.

He testified.

He made

He called his own

He submitted documentary evidence which was received.

He cross-examined Mrs. Osguthorpe and her counsel.

He submitted

pleadings, objections and motions in connection with the hearing.
Based upon the foregoing, and the guidelines provided in Burgers
and Boggs, supra., Dr. Osguthorpe's claim that he was denied due
process must likewise fail.
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It is respectfully requested that this court affirm the trial
court's decision in relation to the contempt issue in all respects.
POINT III
DR. OSGUTHORPE'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN AWARDING MRS. OSGUTHORPE CERTAIN
ATTORNEY'S FEES RELATED TO THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT EXTRAORDINARY WRIT ACTION AND THE
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS ACTION IS NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT AND
SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED.
In Point VI of Dr. Osguthorpe's Brief, he argues that the
trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Osguthorpe the attorney's fees
and

costs

she

incurred

in connection with the Petition

for

Extraordinary Writ filed by Dr. Osguthorpe in the Utah Supreme
Court and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Dr.
Osguthorpe in the United States District Court, both of which were
determined to be without merit and denied.
Dr. Osguthorpe's claim that the trial court erred in awarding
Mrs. Osguthorpe certain attorney's fees should be summarily denied,
since it is not properly before this Court in connection with this
Appeal.

Dr. Osguthorpe filed his Notice of Appeal in this matter

on June 24, 1992.

(R-632.)

(See Addendum.)

The trial court's

Order awarding Mrs. Osguthorpe those fees was signed and entered by
Judge Wilkinson on December 3, 1992. (See Addendum,,) No Notice of
Appeal has been filed in connection with that Order.
Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provide the following deadline in which to appeal a trial court's
order:
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RULE 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(1) Filing appeal from final orders and
judgments.
An appeal may be taken from a
district# juvenile, or circuit court to the
appellate court with jurisdiction over the
appeal from all final orders and judgments,
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial
court within the time allowed by Rule 4.
Failure of an appellant to take any step other
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal
does not affect the validity of the appeal,
but is ground only for such action as the
appellate court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the
award of attorney fees.
RULE 4.

Appeal as of right: when taken.

(1) Appeal from final judgment and
order.
In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial
court to the appellate court, the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with
the clerk of the trial court within 3 0 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from . . .
The

3 0 day time period has passed and consequently this Court

lacks jurisdiction to consider this claim of error.

(See, Yost v.

State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981), Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320
(Utah 1982).)
Additionally, what appears to be an attempt by Dr. Osguthorpe
to argue an issue that clearly is not properly before this Court,
should be considered in connection with Mrs. Osguthorpe's request
for an award of her attorney's fees and costs incurred by her in
relation to this appeal.

(See POINT IV below.)
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POINT IV
MRS. OSGUTHORPE SHOULD BE AWARDED ALL OF HER
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN
CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) is the
statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees in divorce actions.
It states that:
The Court may order either party to pay to the
clerk a sum of money . . . to enable such
party to prosecute or defend the action.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's fees
incurred both at the trial and appellate levels. See [Dahlberg v.
Dahlberg. 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930)

Carter v. Carter, 584,

P. 2d 904 (Utah 1978) and Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P. 2d 162 (Utah
App. 1989).]
In considering whether or not to award Mrs. Osguthorpe the
attorney's fees and costs she has been required to incur in
connection with this appeal, it becomes imperative for this Court
to understand the history of this case as it relates to Dr.
Osguthorpe's obstinate and contumacious behavior

and

lack of

respect for the judicial process, the court's authority and the
substantial financial and emotional hardship his attitude has
created for Mrs. Osguthorpe.
The following are but a few examples of Dr. Osguthorpe1 s
behavior and attitude demonstrated since this case was originally
filed.
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1)

The original Findings of the trial court in relation to

Dr. Osguthorpe's income and ability to earn:
The Defendant has chosen to be employed by his
father at a salary which appears to be less
than he could make in another independent
employment situation, and it appears that the
Defendant has the ability to earn more than he
presently does.
The Court further received
conflicting testimony as to whether or not the
tax
returns
of
the
parties
accurately
reflected the amount of monies available to
meet the family's financial needs, and the
Court finds that the tax returns appear to
understate the actual net income that was
available to the parties during the marriage
for family and living expenses. (R-256.)
2)

Dr.

Osguthorpe's

testimony

at

the

January

7,

1992,

hearing on contempt where he:
a)

Stated he'd pay child support when certain minor

items of personal property were returned to him and later on
in the proceedings denied he'd so testified.

(January 7,

1992, hearing, Transcript Vol. II p. 35, 64);
b)

Denied he had made statements reflecting a total

lack of concern about his potential for being incarcerated for
not paying child support.

The actual tape recording and

transcript of that conversation were received as evidence and
listened to during the course of the hearing.
1992, Transcript p. 74, 111.)

(January 7,

A copy of that transcript is

included in the Addendum to this Brief;
c)

Would not identify the $155,000.00, 4,000+ square

foot home he and his new wife were residing in, even when
shown a picture of the same. (January 7, 1992, Transcript p.
69, 99, and Exhibit 14, a copy of which has been included in
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the Addendum to this Brief);
d)
trial,

In all stages of these proceedings,
first

appeal,

numerous

hearings

(pre-trial,

after

remand)

attorney's fees have been assessed against Dr. Osguthorpe and
he has paid nothing towards any such award.
e)

The Trial Court's statements made in connection with

the January 7, 1992, contempt hearing:
Counsel hit the nail on the head, that if
you came into this court showing good faith,
that would be something else.
But not one
dime has been paid; and yet he testified as to
how, 'this is my wife's house, and I have to
pay her $500 a month rent.'
If I had three children, and I loved
those children, I would be paying that child
support long before I paid $500 to live in a
house of that means. If I had an education,
and I was a veterinarian, and I was only
earning $5 an hour, I would certainly be
looking to cinother type of work to earn a
living for my family. I'm just not persuaded,
just not persuaded.
And the testimony of the Defendant, his
credibility is lacking, both he and his wife;
they refuse to ansv/er questions on the stand,
very evasive instecid of just saying the truth
as to what is taking place.
And to
when asked about paying any
child support, how did he word it?
It was,
'not definite,' or something of that sort. He
either knows or he doesn't know.
He just
perjures himself in this courtroom . . . The
court would further find that the Defendant
has had an opportunity to have a hearing here
in the courtroom, that evidence has been taken
regarding the contempt, that his credibility
is in question, he has not answered the
questions put to him truthfully
(Transcript no. 3 January 7, 1992, hearing,
PP- 8,9);
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f)

The trial court's Findings made in connection with

the January 7, 1992, hearing on contempt;
5.

UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY,

a.
Defendant has failed to pay child
support and alimony for considerable periods
of time (See plaintiff's Exhibits 2 , 3 , 4 and
5). Between December 1990 and January 1992,
plaintiff owed defendant $8,400 in child
support, $2,100 in alimony (total $10,500 plus
accrued interest).
Defendant paid $750
leaving an unpaid arrearage of $9,750 (See
plaintiff's Exhibit 5 and $750 owed for
January, 1992.)
No child support has been
paid since February, 1991.
b.
Defendant and his current wife both
testified 'He would pay child support if his
personal items were returned.'
c.
Defendant further testified the
plaintiff had plenty of money and could sell
one of her houses.
d.
Defendant has not demonstrated good
faith in connection with attempting to pay his
ongoing support obligations.
e.
Defendant testified he was paying
his new wife $500 per month rent in order to
reside with her in a home she recently
purchased at 6808 Courtland Circle, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
f.
Defendant
is
a
veterinarian
practicing in excess of 15 years and testified
he earned $5.00 per hour in connection with
consultation he claimed he provided to the
Osguthorpe Animal Hospital. Defendant had and
has the means to pay child support.
g.
The credibility of the defendant and
his present wife is lacking. Both refused to
answer questions on the stand.
Both were
evasive.
The defendant did not answer
questions truthfully.
h.
The defendant's failure to pay his
support obligations as previously ordered was
done willfully, voluntarily and with the full
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knowledge of those obligations as previously
ordered by the Court.
6.
CONTEMPT,
The Court finds the
defendant is in contempt of this Court
pursuant to Section 78-32-1(5) Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended), in that he has
been disobedient of lawful judgments, orders
and processes of this Court. The defendant
had the opportunity to have a full hearincj and
evidence has been taken regarding that
contempt. The defendant has not answered the
questions put to him truthfully. The Court
specifically finds that this is one of the
most flagrant violations of the law as far as
support of children that has come before this
Court, in that the Defendant owes plaintiff in
excess of $16,000 in unpaid child support
alone. Defendant is further in contempt for
his failure to pay alimony and attorney's fees
as previously ordered by the Court.
(R-557-559);
g)

As of the January 7, 1992, hearing, Dr. Osguthorpe

owed Mrs. Osguthorpe over $32,000 in unpaid child support,
alimony and attorney's fees.

(See Exhibits P-2, 3, 4, and 5

included in the Addendum to this Brief);
h)

Between the January 7, 1992, hearing and the May

18, 1992, hearing, Dr. Osguthorpe failed to pay an additional
$2,550.00 in child support and alimony.

(R-615.)

The foregoing are but a few of the many examples of Dr.
Osguthorpe's attitude towards "the system."
Now Dr. Osguthorpe has filed a second appeal. Evidently, the
cost of this appeal is being born by Dr. Osguthorpe's father (page
14 of Appellant's Brief).

Also, it appears that Dr. Osguthorpe

wants this to be a "test case" (Appellant's Brief p. 15) . The Brief
raises points and argues issues outside the scope of the appeal
(Appellant's Brief Point VI).
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When viewed cumulatively, no conclusion can be drawn other
than that Dr. Osguthorpe wants to wear Mrs. Osguthorpe down.
Court should not let that occur.

This

Mrs. Osguthorpe is regularly

reminded of the trial testimony of Mr. Lynn Turnbow, a neighbor of
the parties, about a conversation he had with Dr. Osguthorpe while
this action was pending:
MR. TURNBOW:
A. Well, what I remember, he says that
she really hasn't got a pot to piss in. And
he says, my parents have a lot of money. And
he says, I have a checking account. And my
family can go out and hire the best lawyers.
And he says that she is going to end up with
nothing.
And he says, the amount of money
that I show I make is just not enough that
she's even going to be able to survive with
four kids, and she's going to be out on the
street with nothing. She's going to starve.
MR. KASTING:
Q.
Is there anything else that you can
recall about that conversation as it pertains
to this divorce action that Mr. Osguthorpe
said to you?
MR. TURNBOW:
A.
He just told me that she would be
out on the streets with nothing. And he said,
she's going to have one hell of a time raising
four kids. Because he said, we have the money
that we can drag this on.
We can fight it
forever. He said, her parents have no money
to help her. And he said that the only way
she can hire a lawyer is to go take a second
mortgage on a second house that they have, I
guess.
(R-318-320.)
When a party to a divorce action acts or fails to act in such
a way as to cause the other party to incur unnecessary attorney's
fees,

it

is

most

appropriate

for

the

Court

to

recalcitrant party to reimburse the other those fees.
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988).]
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require

the

[(See Porco

This Brief has demonstrated that the points raised by Dr.
Osguthorpe on this appeal are without merit.

In addition, his

actions throughout the course of this litigation reveal motives and
attitudes which should never be tolerated by the judicial system.
It is respectfully requested that Mrs. Osguthorpe be awarded
all of her attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with
this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The appeal which has now been taken by Dr. Osguthorpe is
wholly lacking in merit.

Utah law is clear on the trial court's

powers and duties in relation to contempt proceedings.

Dr.

Osguthorpe's appeal is fatally flawed in that 1) the claims of
error he argues arise from Findings and Orders on which no appeal
has been taken and 2) even assuming that such failure to properly
appeal is not fatal, the trial court cited correctly and in accord
with Utah law in the manner it dealt with the contempt proceeding.
Given the history of this case, Dr. Osguthorpe's questionable
credibility and the lack of merit of this appeal, Mrs. Osguthorpe
should be awarded all of her attorney's fees and costs incurred in
having to respond to this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

*2~

day of ^eJb^oaXu7

DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

SHARON A. DONOVAN
KENT M. KASTING
SHANNON W. CLARK
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent.
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1993.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a representative of Dart, Adamson and
Donovan, hereby certifies that two (2) true and correct copies of
the foregoing, BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, dated February 2, 1993, was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of record:
Craig S. Cook, Esg.
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

lAOA-A^

33

ADDENDUM
INDEX TO ADDENDUM
Page
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d
530 Utah App. 1990)

A-l

Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Judgments,
Contempt Order sanctions and Other Relief
(September 25, 1991)

A-9

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law In Re:
Hearings, Enforcement, Objections and other
Relief (January 24, 1992)

A-25

Order and Judgment In Re: hearing on
Defendant's Objections to Written Order
and Judgments, etc. (January 24, 1992)

A-35

Letter to Dr. Osguthorpe (March 5, 1992)

A-41

Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Judgment,
Attorney's fees and Jail Sentence
(April 30, 1992)

A-42

Plaintiff's Notice of Hearing (May 7, 1992)

A-47

Affidavit of Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe
(June 4, 1992)

A-49

Order Finding Defendant in Contempt and
Imposing Jail Sentence and Judgment
(June 19, 1992)

A-51

Warrant and Order of Commitment
(June 5, 1992)

A-55

Defendant's Notice of Appeal (June 24, 1992)

A-57

Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters
(December 3, 1992)

A-58

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 re: Plaintiff's
child support and alimony arrearages

A-62

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 re: Summary of
amounts owed by Defendant

A-64

Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 re: Summary of
Judgment entered November 1990

A-66

34

16.
17.

18.
19.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 re: Total unpaid
child support and alimony arrearages

A

Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 re: Transcript of
conversation between Plaintiff and
Defendant on March 27, 1991

A

Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 re: photo of
Defendant's residence

A

Utah Statutes Cited

A

35

530

Utah

804 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

by rendering advisory services. Neither
the performance of these functions nor this
Court's approval of the budget transforms
the Bar into a "public agency."2
In addition, the Utah State BaT Association has a number of attributes of nongovernmental organizations. It is a private
organization. It has the capacity to sue
and be sued. It owns real property in its
own name, and the State has no interest
therein.3 See Rules for Integration and
Management of the Utah State Bar, Rule
(A)l. The Bar pays taxes on its real and
personal property. Although it is subject
to the supervision of the Utah Supreme
Court, it is in large part self-governed by
Bar commissioners who are elected by Bar
members. Employees are not paid by the
state and are not entitled to any benefits
given state employees. The Bar is funded
completely by the dues and fees paid by its
members and Bar applicants; it receives no
public funds or tax revenues. It exists
independently of the legislative and executive branches of state government. When
it is sued, it hires its own counsel. It is not
treated as a state agency by the Attorney
General, the State Auditor, or the Treasurer, nor is it under the control or supervision
of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
Although its budget has recently been approved by this Court, it is not subject to the
approval of the Legislature.
Further, the Bar conducts a number of
activities not related to its regulatory functions in the admission and discipline of attorneys. The Bar provides a number of
public services, such as numerous professional educational courses and seminars, a
lawyer referral program, and public education programs. It staffs small claims
courts, publishes a newsletter containing
educational and disciplinary information,
and collects funds through a voluntary program which are used to reimburse clients
for financial losses caused by the unethical
conduct of lawyers. The Bar has acquired,
operates, and maintains the Law and Jus-

tice Center. The acquisition was accomplished entirely without governmental
funds.
The Utah Constitution assigns to this
Court the power to "govern the practice of
law." Article VIII, § 4. We need not, and
therefore do not, decide whether that grant
ousts the Legislature from all control over
the Bar or whether the Records Act and
Writings Act would be unconstitutional if
applied to the Bar. We decide only that, as
written, those acts do not apply to the Bar
because it is not a "state agency" or "public office" within the meaning of those acts.
Because the judgment of the trial court
must be reversed, it follows that the plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees or exemplar}' damages.
Reversed in part; affirmed in part.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

Jeanette OSGUTHORPE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Jerry OSGUTHORPE, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 890219-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 19, 1990.
On Rehearing May 10, 1990.
Husband in divorce action appealed
from factual findings, legal conclusions and

2. It was of no consequence in Keller that the 3. The Bar's present facility was financed by
California Legislature approved the budget of
contributions and fees paid by Bar members, by
the California State Bar. See Keller v. State Bar
contributions from the public and charitable
of California, 495 US.
, 110 S.CL 2228, 110
trusts, and by a mortgage loan from a bank.
LEd^d 1 (1990).
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divorce decree entered in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J. The Court of Appeals held that: (1)
trial court, in determining alimony award,
was not required to make specific finding
regarding husband's income, but could determine that husband was either earning
more than evidence indicated or had ability
to earn more money; (2) evidence supported trial court's determination that cash
gift from husband's father was intended
for both parties and, thus, court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to award
such cash to husband; (3) trial court was
not required to award husband interest on
husband's equitable lien against parties'
property as lien had not yet been reduced
to judgment; and (4) evidence of reasonableness and need was sufficient to support
award of attorney fees to wife.
Affirmed.
1. Divorce <s=>237
In determining alimony, trial court
must consider financial conditions and
needs of receiving spouse, ability of receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for
him or herself, and ability of responding
spouse to provide support.

4. Divorce <^252.1, 286(5)
In determining division of property in
divorce action, trial court has wide discretion in adjusting financial and property interests and its actions are entitled to presumption of validity.
5. Divorce <3=>252.3(3)
In making equitable property division
in divorce action, trial courts should generally award property acquired by one spouse
by gift and inheritance during marriage to
that spouse, together with any appreciating
or enhancement of its value, unless other
spouse has contributed to enhancement,
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring equitable interest in
it, or property has been consumed or its
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where acquiring spouse has
made gift of interest in property to other
spouse. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
6. Divorce <s=*253(2)
Evidence supported trial court's determination in divorce action that cash gift
from husband's father was intended for
both parties and, thus, court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to award such
cash to husband; while husband's father
testified that gifts were given solely for
husband, wife testified that she had always
believed gifts were for both parties and,
with exception of gift made at about time
of parties' separation, gifts were made in
form of checks payable jointly to both parties.

2. Divorce <s»239
Trial court, in determining alimony
award, was not required to make specific
finding regarding husband's income, but
could determine that husband was either
earning more than evidence indicated or
had ability to earn more money; trial court
stated that husband, a veterinarian claiming monthly income of $1,192.80, had chosen to be employed by his father at lower
salary than he could have earned.

7. Interest <s»52
Trial court in divorce proceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of interest on
judgment for unpaid child support U.C.A.
1953, 15-1-4.

3. Divorce e=>307
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in failing to make specific finding regarding husband's income in awarding wife
monthly child support of $150 per child;
trial court determined that husband was
either understating his actual income or
had chosen employment which paid less
than he could otherwise earn. U.C.A.1953,
30-3-5.

8. Liens «=»7
"Equitable lien," unlike "judgment"
required to bear interest at statutory rate,
only gives lienholder right to collect debt
out of chairged property, whereas "judgment" is final consideration and determination of court on matters submitted to it in
action or proceeding. U.C.A.1953, 15-1-4.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
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9. Interest «=>21
Trial court in divorce proceeding was
not required to award husband interest on
husband's equitable lien against parties'
property as lien had not yet been reduced
to judgment: court stated that lien amount
should be paid to husband when wife remarried, cohabited, sold home, moved from
home, or when youngest child reached age
of majority, whichever occurred first. U.C.
A.1953, 15-1-4.
10. Divorce e=>227(l)
To recover attorney fees in divorce
proceeding, movant must demonstrate that
award is "reasonable" and that need of
requesting party compels award; factors
for determining reasonableness include necessity for number of hours utilized, reasonableness of rate charged in light of
difficulty of case and result accomplished,
and rates commonly charged for similar
services in community.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

11. Divorce <>226
Evidence of reasonableness and need
was sufficient to support award of attorney
fees to wife in divorce action; wife's attorney stated that his hourly rate of $100 per
hour was reasonable and court found that
wife did not have ability to pay fees and
that husband did have ability to pay portion
of wife's fees and costs.
On Petition for Rehearing
12. Divorce e=>224
Before court will award attorney fees,
trial court must find requesting part}* is in
need of financial assistance and that fees
requested are reasonable. U.CA. 1953, 303-3.
13. Divorce ^ 2 2 6
Evidence supported trial court's findings that wife in divorce action did not have
ability to pay attorney fees incurred at trial
and that husband should pay portion of
wife's attorney fees, warranting award to
wife of her costs and reasonable attorney
fees incurred on husband's appeal. U.CA.
1953, 30-3-3.
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David S. Dolowitz, M. Joy Douglas,
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant.
Kent M. Kasting, Dart, Adamson &
Kasting, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and
DAVIDSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Defendant, Jerry Osguthorpe, appeals
from the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and divorce decree. On
appeal, he claims the trial court's findings
of fact regarding alimony and child support
are unsupported by the evidence and the
trial court erred in allocating the parties'
resources, failing to award him the gifts
his father gave to him during the marriage,
and requiring him to pay plaintiffs attorney fees. We affirm.
The parties were married in 1974 and
separated in 1988. Four children, who at
the time of the divorce ranged in age from
eight to twelve, were born as issue of the
marriage. Prior to the marriage, both parties essentially completed their undergraduate degrees. In 1974, defendant began
veterinarian school, and his father paid for
tuition and books. While defendant was in
school, plaintiff worked as a waitress and
cashier. In 1977, defendant received his
degree and began working in his father's
veterinary clinic. At trial, defendant testified that he was a consultant for his father
and received $2,000 per month. Additionally, defendant stated that he receives $350
per month rental income. After taxes and
business expenses, defendant testified that
his net income was $1,192 per month and
his monthly living expenses were $2,049.60.
Plaintiff testified that she had a college
education with an outdated teaching certificate. She worked as a cashier and waitress while defendant was in veterinarian
school and was a housewife and mother
from 1977 until the parties' separation. At
the time of trial, she was employed as an
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insurance claims processor, earning a net
wage of $770 per month. She testified that
she earned $160 from rental property and
her monthly living expenses were $2,027.
During the marriage, defendant's father
provided the parties with $18,500 for a
downpayment on their home on Chris Lane.
He also gave them various cash gifts, including a $10,000 Christmas gift in both
1982 and 1983, a $5,000 Christmas gift in
1985, and a $1,000 Christmas gift in both
1986 and 1987.
The court found that defendant's testimony indicated a net monthly income of
$1,192.80, including $350 per month from
rental property. However, based on a review of all the documents, the court found
that defendant understated his income or
was underemployed. The court also found
plaintiff had a net rental income of $160,
and a net monthly salary of $770 due to her
employment as an insurance claims processor. Plaintiffs monthly expenses, the
court found, were $2,027. The court noted
that it had received conflicting testimony
regarding whether the parties' tax returns
accurately reflected the amount of money
available to meet the family's needs and
found that the tax returns understated the
actual net income available to the parties
during the marriage for family and living
expenses. The court also found that plaintiff assisted defendant in completing his
education by working, caring for the home
and raising the children. Based on those
facts, the court ordered defendant to pay
plaintiff $150 alimony per month for a period of five years, and $1 per year for an
additional five year period, or until such
time as plaintiff remarries, cohabits or dies,
whichever occurs first. In addition, the
court ordered defendant to pay child support of $150 per month per child.
With regard to the parties' property, the
court awarded plaintiff the home on Hillrise Circle which plaintiff purchased prior
to the marriage. In addition, plaintiff was
awarded exclusive use and occupancy of
the parties' home on Chris Lane, subject to
defendant's non-interest bearing equitable
lien in the amount of $22,500. The court
further found that defendant's father's

cash gifts, including the $18,500 downpayment on the Chris Lane home were intended by defendant's father as a gift to both
parties for their mutual use and benefit
during the marriage. Lastly, the court ordered defendant to pay $3,939.65 of plaintiffs attorney fees.
I. ALIMONY
Defendant claims the trial court's alimony award is based on erroneous findings of
fact regarding defendant's income. Defendant assents the trial court erred in failing
to enter a specific finding regarding defendant's income and in finding defendant was
undercompensated or underemployed. Defendant contends that instead of entering
an alimony award based on speculation, the
court should have made a finding and entered an alimony award based on the evidence. He also claims his alimony and
child support award leave him with $442
per month, an insufficient amount on which
to support himself.
[1] Trial courts have broad discretion in
awarding alimony. Davis v. Davis, 749
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988). We will not
disturb the trial court's alimony award so
long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the court.
Id In determining alimony, the trial court
must consider three factors: 1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce a sufficient income for
him or herself; and 3) the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support
Schindler v. Sckindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90
(Utah CtApp.1989). If the trial court considers these factors, this court will not
disturb tine alimony award unless such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion. Id
[2] With regard to plaintiffs financial
conditions and needs, the court found that
plaintiff had a net monthly income of $770,
received $160 per month from rental property, and had $2027 in monthly expenses.
The count also reviewed plaintiffs ability to
produce a sufficient income for herself in
stating that plaintiff assisted defendant in
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completing veterinarian school by working
and caring for the house and children. The
court also found that plaintiff has a college
education with a teaching certificate but
that her certificate was not presently renewed. At the time of trial, although
plaintiff was employed, her employment
would soon end. However, the court found
that she is capable of finding good, gainful
substitute employment
Regarding defendant's ability to provide
support, the trial court found that defendant testified he received $2,000 per month
from his employment as a veterinarian and
an additional S350 per month from barn
rental. After taxes and business expenses,
defendant claimed to have a net monthly
income of SI.192.80 and monthly expenses
of $2049.60. The court reviewed the testimony and the tax returns of the parties
and found that defendant receives more
monthly income than that reflected on his
exhibit. Further, the court found that defendant is employed by his father and was
either overpaid when he began his employment or underpaid at present. In determining the amount of alimony to award,
the court stated that defendant has the
ability to earn more than his present income and has chosen to be employed by his
father at a lower salary. Also, the court
stated that the tax returns, which indicated
a yearly adjusted gross income of between
$15,000 and $21,000 from 1982 to 1987,
appear to understate the parties' income
during the marriage. Based on these
facts, the court awarded plaintiff $150
monthly alimony for five years. After five
years the court reduced alimony to $1 per
year for five years, untfl plaintiff remarries, cohabits or dies, whichever occurs
first
We find no error in the trial court's failure to make a specific finding regarding
defendant's income in this circumstance.
The trial court found that defendant was
not being candid as to his actual current
income or was purposefully underemployed. We defer to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Riche v. Riche,
784 P.2d 465,467 (Ct.App.1989). Given the
evidence in the record, it was well within
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the court's discretion to determine that defendant was either earning more than the
evidence indicated or had the ability to earn
more money. We therefore will not disturb the trial court's alimony award.
II. CHILD SUPPORT
[3] Similarly, defendant argues the trial
court erred in awarding plaintiff monthly
child support of $150 per child without entering a specific finding regarding defendant's income. Defendant claims the trial
court failed to consider all of the factors
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7
(Supp.1989) in accordance with Jefferies v.
Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah CtApp.
1988).
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989),
the trial court has broad equitable power to
order child support, taking into account the
needs of the children and the ability of the
parent to pay. Woodward v. Woodward,
709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). The trial
court's finding of fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.
Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911. "Failure of the
trial court to make findings on all material
issues is reversible error unless the facts in
the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment'" Acton v. J.B.
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233,
236 (Utah 1983)). Further, section 78-45-7
enumerates the following material factors
that the court must consider in setting prospective support:
(a) the standard of living and situation of
the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in
failing to make specific findings on all of
the factors. However, the court made find-
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ings regarding the relative wealth and income of the parties, their respective abilities to earn, and the children's mother's
monthly expenses to provide for the children's needs. Further, the evidence in the
record indicates that defendant was thirtyseven at the time of trial, while plaintiff
was thirty-five. Defendant again claims
the court erred in failing to enter a specific
finding regarding defendant's income.
Without such a finding, defendant claims,
the court cannot determine an appropriate
level of child support. We disagree. The
trial court considered the evidence and assessed the credibility of defendant's testimony. Given the evidence, the court determined that defendant was either understating his actual income or had chosen
employment which paid less than he could
otherwise earn. We defer to the trial
court's assessment that defendant had an
ability to earn more than he purported to
earn and find no abuse of discretion in the
court's award of child support in accordance with that assessment.
III. GIFTS
Defendant also contends the trial court
erred in failing to award him gifts his
father gave to him during the marriage
while returning to plaintiff her premarital
property. Defendant claims entitlement to
various cash gifts and an $18,500 loan his
father made available to the parties for a
downpayment on the Chris Lane home.
Because defendant's father testified that
the gifts were intended for his son and not
the parties jointly, defendant claims the
court should have awarded him those gifts.
[4] There is no fixed formula for determining a division of property in a divorce
action. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d
1144, 1146 (Utah Ct.App.1988). The trial
court has wide discretion in adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Id. Absent a showing of a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion, we will not
interfere with a property award. Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121,
123 (Utah CtApp.1988).

[5] Section 30-3-5 (1989), provides:
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and parties." In making an "equitable" division,
trial courts should generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and
inheritance during the marriage to that
spouse together with any appreciating or
enhancement of its value unless: 1) the
other spouse has contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or 2) the property has
been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse had made a gift of an
interest in the property to the other spouse.
Mortensen v. Mortensent 760 P.2d 304, 308
(Utah 1988). However, in making equitable orders pursuant to section 30-3-5,
the court has consistently concluded that
the trial court is given broad discretion in
dividing property, regardless of its source
or time of acquisition. Burke v. Burke,
733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).
[6] Defendant claims that because the
gifts were intended for him, the trial court
erred in failing to award him those gifts in
accordance with Mortensen. However, the
trial court found the gifts were intended
for both parties and we will not overturn
the court's factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
The record indicates that although defendant's father testified that the $18,500
downpayment and the other cash gifts given during the marriage were solely for his
son, plaintiff testified that she always believed the gifts were for both parties. In
addition, both defendant and his father testified that, with one exception, the gifts
were made in the form of checks made
payable jointly to both defendant and plaintiff. The one check that was made out to
defendant only was made at about the time
of the parties' separation. The trial judge
stated from the bench that the past history
of gift giving as compared to the gift given
at the time of the separation indicated that
defendant's father intended the previous
gifts to be for both parties. In light of the
evidence in the record, the court's finding
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that the cash gifts were intended for both
parties is not clearly erroneous. Thus,
Mortensen, which sets forth a test for gifts
given to one spouse during the marriage, is
inapplicable. Further, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's decision not to
award defendant those gifts.
IV. INTEREST
Defendant also claims the trial court
failed to award him interest on his equitable lien on the Chris Lane property
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4
(1986).
[7,8] According to section 15-1-4
(1986), all judgments, other than those rendered on a lawful contract, shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum. In
addition, the trial court in a divorce proceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of
interest on a judgment for unpaid child
support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d 905,
906 (Utah 1988). However, an equitable
hen, nnhke a judgment, only gives the lienholder a right to collect the debt out of the
charged property. Citizens Bank v. Elks
Bldg., N. V., 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A
judgment, on the other hand, is "the final
consideration and determination of a court
on matters submitted to it in an action or
proceeding." Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d
332, 445 P.2d 701, 702 (1968).
[9] The decree awarded plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the Chris Lane
home subject to a non-interest bearing equitable lien in favor of defendant for onehalf of the present equity in the home.
The court stated that the lien amount
should be $22,500 and should be paid to
defendant when plaintiff remarries, cohabits, sells the home, moves from the home,
or when the youngest child reaches the age
of majority, whichever occurs first The
equitable hen awarded defendant has not
yet been reduced to judgment. Thus, defendant was awarded an equitable lien to
which interest does not attach under section 15-1-4. We therefore affirm the trial
court's award to defendant of a non-interest bearing equitable lien on the parties'
property for $22,500.
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V. ATTORNEY FEES
[10] Finally, defendant maintains the
trial court erred in awarding plaintiff attorney fees because there was insufficient
evidence of need and reasonableness. To
recover attorney fees in a divorce proceeding, the movant must demonstrate that the
award is reasonable and that the need of
the requesting party compels the award.
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 832
(Utah Ct.App.1989). Factors for determining reasonableness include the necessity
for the number of hours utilized, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of
the difficulty of the case and the result
accomplished and the rates commonly
charged for similar services in the community. Id.
[11] In this case, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate plaintiffs need, given
her income and financial responsibilities.
In addition, plaintiffs attorney profferred
that he had been practicing in the area of
domestic relations law for fifteen years and
was familiar with the rates charged in domestic actions. He also stated that his
hourly rate was $100 per hour and he considered that to be reasonable. He itemized
the rates charged for associates, paralegals
and clerks and stated that those rates were
reasonable in his professional opinion.
Plaintiffs attorney reviewed his time
records and estimated the total fee and
cost award would be $7,869.30. The court
found that plaintiffs evidence of attorney
fees in the amount of $7,879.30 was reasonable and necessary. The court further
found that plaintiff does not have the ability to pay the fees and that defendant has
the ability to pay a portion of plaintiffs
fees and costs. Finally, the court found
that the hourly rate is reasonable and consistent with the rate for similar services in
the community and the hours expended
were necessary.
In hght of the evidence \n the record, we
find sufficient evidence of reasonableness
and need regarding the attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney
fees.
Affirmed.
All concur.

STATE v. MELD

Utah

537

Cite as 804 VIA 537 (IJuhApp. 199G)

ORDER ON PETITION FOR
REHEARING
This matter is before the court pursuant
to plaintiffs petition for rehearing. Plaintiff claims she is entitled to attorney fees
and costs on appeal
[12] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989)
provides that this court may order either
party to pay attorney fees incurred, including attorney fees incurred on appeal.
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah
Ct.App.1989). Before a court will award
attorney fees, the trial court must find the
requesting party is in need of financial
assistance and that the fees requested are
reasonable. Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788
P.2d 1057, 1061 (Utah Ct.App.1990).
[13] Defendant claims plaintiff has sufficient means to pay her attorney fees incurred on appeal in light of the court's
finding that plaintiff is capable of finding
good, gainful employment, the award of
alimony and child support, and the property
distribution. However, the trial court
found that plaintiff did not have the ability
to pay her attorney fees incurred at trial
and that defendant should pay a portion of
plaintiffs attorney fees. Because those
findings are supported by the evidence we
award plaintiff her costs and reasonable
attorney fees incurred on appeal and remand to the trial court for a determination
of reasonable attorney fees plaintiff has
incurred on appeal.
All concur.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
Kevin Jon NIELD, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890465-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 28, 1990.

Defendant was convicted of burglary
of business after jury trial in the Fourth
District Court, Millard County, Cullen Y.
Christensen, J. Defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1)
bolt cutters seized from defendant's apartment in course of carrying out search for
items specified in valid warrant, were lawfully seized pursuant to plain view doctrine
and, thus, were properly admissible, and (2)
defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right was not abridged by trial court's
admission of edited version of codefendant's confession which made no reference
whatsoever to defendant's existence.
Affirmed.

1. Searches and Seizures <5=>149
Bolt cutters seized from defendant's
apartment in course of carrying out search
for items specified in valid warrant were
lawfully seized pursuant to plain view doctrine, and thus, were properly admissible in
trial on charge of burglary of business,
where bolt cutters were in plain view in
part of defendant's apartment in which police were authorized by warrant to search
for other specified items, and bolt cutters
were clearly incriminating in that burglary
had been accomplished by cutting medium
link chain on door to gain entry. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
2. Searches and Seizures <s=>149
In course of carrying out search for
items specified in valid warrant, other
items not so listed may be lawfully seized
under plain view doctrine. U.S.C.A. Const
Amende 4.
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KENT M. KASTING (1772)
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff,

:
:

PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER,
SANCTIONS AND OTHER RELIEF

v.

:

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,

:

Case No. D87-4967

:

Judge Wilkinson

Defendant.

oooOooo
Plaintiff by her attorney Kent M. Kasting, hereby moves
the Court for an Order as follows:
1.

Awarding plaintiff a judgment against defendant in

the amount of $6,930.53 together with interest, representing
$6,750.00 for additional child support and alimony arrearages
accruing since the last hearing in this matter in November, 1990,
plus $180.53 representing defendant's one-half share of medical
expenses incurred for the parties1 children;
2.

Finding defendant in contempt of court for his

willful and contemptuous refusal to abide the orders of this
Court in regard to his child support and alimony obligations, his
failure to pay previously ordered judgments for attorney's fees
and costs, and his repeated violation and disregard of the
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restraining orders set forth in paragraph 4 of the Decree of
Divorce and subsequent recommendations and orders, and imposing
appropriate sanctions against defendant for said actions of
contempt, including a specified term in the Salt Lake County
Jail;
3.

Awarding plaintiff her attorney's fees and costs

in the bringing of this Motion before the Court;
4.

Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate

in the circumstances.
This Motion is more fully supported by the following
facts and circumstances:
1.

A hearing was held in this matter in November,

1990, before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Commissioner, in
which she recommended plaintiff be awarded total judgments
against defendant in the sum of $22,438.10.

Included in this

judgment were child support and alimony arrearages accrued
through November, 1990 of $11,678.26 together with interest. The
detail of the amounts making up this total judgment is summarized
on the attached Exhibit "A".

Defendant rejrected that

recommendation and a hearing on that rejection was held before
the Honorable Homer Wilkinson on January 4, 1991.
Wilkinson ruled on that rejection.
and defendant objected to the same.

Judge

Plaintiff prepared an Order,
No hearing has been held on

those objections.

A-\o
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2.

Since the November 1990 hearing before

Commissioner Peuler, defendant has continued his blatant
disregard of his obligations of child support and alimony as
shown by the payment record below:
Accrued
Child Support

Accrued
Alimony

Paid

$600

$150

$375

January, 1991

600

150

-0-

February

600

150

375

March

600

150

-0-

April

600

150

-0-

May

600

150

-0-

June

600

150

-0-

July

600

150

-0-

August

600

150

-0-

September

600

150

-0-

$6,000

$1,500

$750

Month
December, 1990

TOTALS
TOTAL UNPAID ARREARAGES

$6.750

Plaintiff requests judgment against defendant in the amount of
$6,750 plus interest for these arrearages.
3.

Plaintiff has incurred additional medical expenses

in 1991 for the parties' children in the total amount of $361.06
as set forth in Exhibit "Bff attached hereto.

Defendant has

failed and refused to pay^ his one-half share in the amount of
$180.53 and plaintiff requests judgment for that amount.

A-ll
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Defendant has repeatedly demanded that certain

items of personal property be given to him over and above those
awarded him in the Decree.

Plaintiff has attempted on several

occasions to give these items to defendant but he has failed and
refused to make arrangements for pick-up and transportation of
these items.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a Statement of a

police officer whom plaintiff had asked to come to her home to
serve as a neutral witness and, if necessary, keeper of the peace
on February 23, 1991, to be present during the appointed time
period when defendant and plaintiff had agreed he could pick up
his personal property.

The Statement at Exhibit C sets forth

that defendant never did show up, but called numerous times to
demand that plaintiff bring the items to him, despite the fact
that she explained to him that she did not have a truck or any
means of transporting the items.

Defendant does own a truck and

had the means of picking up the items, but refused to do so, and
ultimately never did show up.
5.

Defendant has repeatedly violated restraininq

orders in the Decree of Divorce and in the Order issued by the
Court following the November, 1990 hearing against him coming
upon the residence of plaintiff and against threats and physical
violence.

Defendant has continued to violate these orders on

numerous occasions, requiring the police to be called.

Attached

hereto as Exhibit flDff is a Report of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office describing a kidnapping and assault incident on
4

A

June, 10, 1991•

Plaintiff's father, Don Crawford, was driving

the parties' children in his truck from plaintiff's home to his
own when he passed defendant on the road near plaintiff's home.
Defendant slammed on his brakes, jumped out of his own vehicle
and then leaped into the back of Mr. Crawford's truck.

He then

proceeded to physically assault Mr. Crawford through an open
window into the cab while Mr. Crawford was trying to drive.

When

Mr. Crawford stopped the car, defendant forced the children from
the vehicle and forcibly took them with him.

Despite

intervention of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department,
defendant refused to reveal the whereabouts of the children.

He

was subsequently arrested and booked on charges of felony kidnap
assault.

Defendant obviously has no regard for the safety or

physical welfare of other persons, including his own children,
and should be found in contempt of court for his repeated and
willful violations and disregard of the restraining orders
previously entered by this court.
6.

Defendant's attitude of contempt for the orders of

this Court throughout the history of this case, and since the
November, 1990 hearing, is blatant and shameless.

Plaintiff

requests the Court impose appropriate sanctions against
defendant, including but not limited to sentencing him to an
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appropriate term in the County Jail for his contemptuous
behavior.
DATED this

1/

day of September, 1991.

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, being first duly sworn
under oath, deposes and says:
She is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and
has read the foregoing Motion and knows the contents thereof and
that the same is true of her own knowledge, except as to those
matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to
those matters, she believes them to be true.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this '^°
Septej^^.l^l,,,........
i ^SS5V
3 j4Zfe«&L
I^GMWA
I uA Hkfflr MM
3 V ® V
! ^^g>^

Notary Pubflo
J
JENNIFER OLSON
I
1501 So. Lincoln SL
l
My Commission CJXXBS I
March23.19ar
I
StateofUtah
J

Commission expires

day of

io/Us
NOgP^i PUBLIC
(
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
day of September,
1991, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Verified Motion to:
Dr. Jerry Osguthorpe
4850 South 2126 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Defendant Pro Se.
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SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT ENTERED NOVEMBER, 1990
Child support and alimony arrearages
September, 1988 - October, 1990

$10,928.26

Interest on support/alimony arrearages
through October, 1990

857.55

Credit to Jerry for net amount owed
by Jeanette to Jerry for uninsured
medical expenses of children

(56.59)

Credit to Jerry for repair costs to
his truck

(150.00)

Replacement value of VCR removed
by Jerry from Jeanette's home
(Paragraph 13(A)(2) Decree of Divorce)
Attorney's fee judgment entered 3/1/89
(Paragraph 14 Decree of Divorce)

300.00*
3,939.65

Interest on Attorney's fee judgment
@12% per annum through October, 1990
($39.40 per month simple interest x
20 months)

788.00

Judgments for car rental fees $320
and attorney's fees $200
(Order, January 1989

520.00

Interest on Judgments 1/89
@12% interest = $5.20 per month
for 21 months through October, 1990

109.20

SUBTOTAL
Appeal:

$17,236.07

Attorney's fees

3,820.00

Costs

590.50

Amounts accruing November, 1990 (see attachment)
Credit to Jerry for skis sold at garage sale
TOTAL

891.53
(100.00)
$22,438.10

*Note: Since entry of the judgment, defendant has returned the
VCR to plaintiff, and plaintiff is willing to credit $300 against
the judgment for that item.
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The following additional amounts were
due by the end of November, 1990:
Child support $600; Alimony $150

$750.00

Interest on support/alimony arrearages
for November:

$11,678.26 x .0083

Interest on attorney's fee judgment, Decree
Interest on car rental/atty fee judgments
1/89 Order
TOTAL ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS, November, 1990

A~ll

96.93
3 9.40
5.20
$891.53

000474

ADDITIONAL HEALTH EXPENSES PAID BY JEANETTE OSGUTHORPE
SINCE JANUARY, 1991
)ate

Provider

!/14/91

Dr. Swinyer (Jennifer, wart)

1/14/91

University Pharmacy (wart)

/6/91
3/25
76/91

Charges

Ins. Paid

Uninsured

$41.50

$0.00

$41.50

7.63

0.00

7.63

Dr. Morgan (John, dental)

102.00

55.00

47.00

Dr. Morgan (Jennifer, dental)

141.00

49.00

92.00

10.70

0.00

10.70

60.00

20.00

40.00

51.00

15.00

36.00

50.00

0.00

50.00

36.23

0.00

36.23

$500.06

$139.00

$361.06

: 3/25
/4/91

Osco Drug (Julie, Rx)

/25/91

Dr. Morgan (Jeff, dental)

/2 5/91

Dr. Morgan (Jennifer, dental)

718/91
71/91

Dr. Homer Smith (Jennifer)
Utah Optical (Jennifer)

X)TALS
?OTAL HEALTH EXPENSES PAID BY JEANETTE

$361.06

rERRY OSGUTHORPE1S SHARE @ ONE-HALF

$180.53
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INITIAL REPORT
Method:

Hense Classffloadon A Typo of Offense:

""06

I TO

Time of Occurrence:

1902

||l

•(S/^riFwrini

Phone Number:

Name of Bust

Idress of Occurrence:

1760 East 7000 South (Fort Union Blvd.)

Middle Name:

First Name:

imp: Victim J Last Name:
dress:

7049 South Chris Lane

c Q_Home Phone:

zlJ'Uode:
(N/6 (N/6)

State

City:

(N/G)

(N/G)

D.O.BVAge:

Race:

01-13-53

Jeanette

OSGUTHORPE

X

1539E

Oate of Occurrence:

FORCIBLE CUSTODY

PERS./SOCIEtY *SEE BELOW

FOLLOW-UP

C

942-4096

(N/G)

interference/kidnap.

WITNESSES:

CViVANNS, Randj

no middle initial given, DOB: 06-29-49, Caucasian male, address:
ris Lane, residence phone: 943-5610.

(J/EVANNS.

Snnrira.^no middle initial given, DOB: 04-15-48, Caucasian female, address:
7031 South Chri s Lane, residence phone: 943-5610.

VICTIM:
Caucasian male, residence ad(Assault victim) CRAWFORD, Don W.. DOB: 07-20-23, Ca
dress: 5466 Wood Crest Drive, Hurray, Utah, phone #: 278-0072.

•,

(Victim of kidnap) OSGUTHORPE, Jeff, age 14, Caucasian male, address: 7049 South
Chris Lane, phone #i y4^-4Uyb.

V (Victim

of kidnap) OSGUTHORPE, John, age 13, same address and phone number.

(Victims of kidnap) twin sisters, OSGUTHORPE, Julie and Jennifer, ages 10 years,
same address and phone number as listea aoove.
ARRESTEE:

/H) SRl/THORPF. Jprrv

S DOR: 11-15-51, Caucasian male, residence address: 2126 East
"0 South, Holiday,"Utah 84117, home phone: 278-8675. Subject is a veterinarian,
is co-owner of Osguthorpe Animal Hospital at 4696 Highland Drive, also the location
of the arrest. Subject was arrested 06-10-91 at 2015 hours, he was transported to
the Salt Lake County Jail, arriving there at 2054 hours, and was booked in on the
following charges: 1) kidnapping, Utah Code 76-5-301.1 paragraph 1 and 2, 2)
Assault, Utah Code 76-5-102. Charges will be files via a fax sheet through the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. Referred to a District Court.

A

/n %

f/S y\ -^v

F

Business Phone:

*TYPE OF OFFENSE:
Custodial

Sex:

*. <

NARRATIVE CONTINUATION SHEET

91-54848

OMtiAL REPORT
D FOLLOW-UP

PROPERTY:
No property loss or damage reported or observed.
PREMISES:
Not given.
NARRATIVE SECTION:
The complainant, Jeanette Osguthorpe, indicates that her father, Don Crawford,
arrived home at about 6:45 p.m. on this date with the eldest of her children,
Jeff Osguthorpe, from a fishing trip. She was getting ready to leave for a wedding reception, and at the suggestion of her father, it was determined that all
of the children would go with him to his residence for a couple of hours, while
she was away. Jeanette was leaving the residence in company with Randy Evanns
and his wife, Sondra Evanns, in their car; and Mr. Crawford, with the children,
in his pick up truck.
They were northbound on Chris Lane. At the intersection of Chris Lane and Fort
Union Blvd. (1760 East), they observed the Arrestee, Jerry Osguthorpe, in his
white Dodge pick up, Utah Listing 9288 BF, approaching that intersection. He
slammed on his brakes, jumped out of his vehicle, and jumped into the back end of
the pick up belonging to Mr. Crawford, and being driven by Mr. Crawford. They
did not know exactly what was happening, and Mr. Crawford turned and went eastbound on Fort Union Blvd.
Mr. Evans was driving his vehicle and had turned to go westbound on Fort Union
Blvd., when they observed Mr. Osguthorpe climbing into the back of the Crawford
vehicle. They immediately returned to the Evanns residence where Jeanette ran
Into the Evanns residence, and called the Sheriff's Office for assistance.
Just prior to my arrival at the Evanns residence at 7301 South Chris La?3, Mr.
Crawford had arrived back, and he was alone in his pick up. He told a stery or
relayed information to me indicating that the suspect, Jerry Osguthorpe,"Had
jumped into the back of his pick up, and forced the rear sliding windowJ^to the
cab open. Through that window, Mr. Osguthorpe was assaulting Mr. Crawfcmd by
hitting him on the side of the face, and on the arms, trying to get him « stop
the vehicle. The assault became so intense, that Mr. Crawford finally f£3 to
stop his vehicle, and did so near the entrance of Dan's Food parking lot^an the
Highland Drive side. He was northbound at that time on Highland Drive, -flr.
Crawford indicated that he was unable to safely drive the vehicle because of the
assault being perpetrated on him by Mr. Osguthorpe. Mr, Crawford then indicates
that Mr. Osguthorpe, through the back window, reached far enough to unlock the
right front door of the pick up truck, and when the vehicle came to a stop alongside the road, he jumped out, and forced, or pulled his children from Mr.
Crawfords' vehicle. He then herded them, and made them run across Highland
Drive, westbound, through the Highland Plaza, or Highland Point strip mall

0001479
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NARRATIVE CONTINUATION SHEET

D FOLLOW-UP

parking lot, and continued westbound, running with the children. Mr. Crawford
yelled after them to stop, and that he would take them back to Mr. Osguthorpe's
vehicle, however, they did not stop. Mr. Crawford indicates that the children
were indeed very frightened, and did not appear to want to go with their father.
Mr. Crawford returned to Chris Lane and found his daughter standing out at 7031
South Chris Lane, at the Evanns residence, and that's where I made contact with
them. Mrs. Osguthorpe provided information regarding the license plate on her
husbands Oodge vehicle, and also another vehicle he owns, a GMC van, Utah Listing
4737 CC. She also gave me an address for Mr. Osguthorpe as being 4050 South 2126
East. That was determined to not be a correct address. Getting directions from
her, I found the correct address to be 2126 East 4850 South. At that location,
contact was made with the current Mrs. Osguthorpe, and she indicated that Jerry
and the children had left town, and were in route to Delta.
If felt that the current Mrs.Osguthorpe was not telling me the truth, so I went
to the Osguthorpe Animal Hospital at 4696 South Highland Drive, and did indeed
find the GMC customized van parked in a driveway on the west end of the
building. I waited in my car for a period of time to observe any movement inside
the building, however, all the blinds were shut, and I could not see into the
building. Mr. Osguthorpe, the suspect and arrestee, exited through a passage
door in the basement of the building, and saw me parked in front of his van. He
momentarily started back into the building, and then hesitated, and came back
out, and started walking towards me. As we met, I confronted him with the
question about where the children were. He indicated that he wasn't going to
tell me where the children were, and that they were alright. At that point in
time, I indicated to Mr. Osguthorpe that charges were being filed against him for
an assault, and for custodial interference; the assault charges being filed by
his ex-father-in-law, and the custodial interference charges being filed by his
ex-wife, Jeanette Osguthorpe. I also indicated to him that it was imperative at
this point in time that I make contact with the children to determine their well
being and welfare. He refused to do this, consequently I arrested Mr. Osguthorpe
at that location at approximately 2015 hours. Deputies from the Eastside Patrol
Division had arrived, and were assisting me with the situation.
I requested presence from the shift supervisor, Sergeant Dennis Coleman, and we
discussed the situation, and were going over statutes of the Utah State Code
Book. It appeared to us from the circumstances that we had been informed of that
a more appropriate charge at this time would probably be the kidnapping qfcarge,
as stated in the Utah Code 76-5-301.1, specifically paragraphs one and twff. The
circumstances mentioned being the forceful nature with which Mr. Osguthorpa chose
to take custody of his children on this date. We both felt that he not only
endangered the lives of his children and his ex-father-in-law, but also M>s own
life in the irrational actions that he took of jumping into the Crawford^jehicle,
and assaulting Mr. Crawford as he was driving that vehicle on Fort Union~|lvd.
Subsequently, I transported Mr. Jerry Osguthorpe to the Salt Lake County^Jail and
had him booked on a felony charge of kidnap, using Utah Code 76-5-301.1, paracl
A
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graphs one and two; and also booked him on the assault charge, using Utah Code
76-5-102. A County Attorney's fact sheet is being submitted. I also filled out
a no warrant arrest fact sheet at the Salt Lake County Jail, indicating these
circumstances surrounding the arrest of Mr. Osguthorpe. Based on the information
I received from the witnesses, the complainant, and Mr. Crawford, the victim, I
felt comfortable in making this type of an arrest.
When I made contact with the children at the veterinary clinic, I also asked them
whether or not they had voluntarily gone with their father. The eldest, Jeff,
Indicated that no, they had not gone voluntarily with him, and that they were
aware it was not his time to have them for visitation. They said they didn't
necessarily want to go to Delta with him for the next couple of days, which he
indicated he was going to do. The two little girls were especially frightened,
and indicated that they were afraid because of the irrational behavior they had
seen in their father. All four of the children also indicated that contrary to
what Mr. Osguthorpe said, he did strike and hit Mr. Crawford while Mr. Crawford
was driving the vehicle.
No further information is available at this time.
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310 South Main, Suite 1330
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff,

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN RE:
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
WRITTEN ORDER AND JUDGMENTS,
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF
DIVORCE, CONTEMPT ORDER, ETC.
FILED JANUARY 11, 1991 AND
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER,
SANCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF
MADE OCTOBER 8, 1991 AND
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR
CONTEMPT CITATION
Civil No. 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

oooOooo
The Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written
Order and Judgements, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt
Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for
Contempt Citation came on for argument and evidentiary hearing on

kl&

Tuesday, January 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:30 a.m.
proceedings concluded at the hour of 4:30 p.m.

The

The plaintiff was

present and represented by her counsel Kent M. Kasting of Dart,
Adamson & Kasting.
himself pro se.

The defendant was present and represented

The parties presented testimony and documentary

evidence and argument in support of their respective positions.
Each party was sworn and testified under oath.

The Court

reviewed the file, the pleadings, motions, and other documents
before the Court and considers itself fully advised in the
premises.

The Court issued its ruling from the bench and now in

connection with that ruling now makes the following Findings of
Fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

NOTICE.

Both parties had proper notice of these

proceedings and the Court has jurisdiction over each of these
parties.

Defendant had the opportunity for a full hearing on

Plaintiff's Request for Contempt.
2.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER DECREE OF DIVORCE.

The defendant at

all times knew and understood the obligations imposed upon him
under Js 4, 6, 7 and 15 of the Decree of Divorce entered in this
matter.
3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Disputes as to the exchanges of

personal property have arisen between the parties in the past and
those disputes have not been able to be voluntarily resolved by
the parties.

Any such disputes are independent from, and not

related to, the defendant's ongoing obligations to pay plaintiff
2

Plaintiff has in the past attempted to make arrangements for the
orderly exchange of this property.
4.

UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES.

The defendant

has challenged plaintiff's claims for reimbursement of medical
and dental expenses not covered by insurance.

Those unreimbursed

expenses through January 4, 1991 were reduced to judgment in
connection with previous hearings held before the Commissioner
and this Court.

With regard to unreimbursed medical and dental

expenses incurred after January 4, 1991 through September 25,
1991, the date of the filing of plaintiff's last Motion,
plaintiff stated she would not seek reimbursement from defendant
for the same.
5.

UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.
a.

Defendant has failed to pay ongoing child support

and alimony for considerable periods of time (See plaintiff's
Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5 ) . Between December 1990 and January 1992,
plaintiff owed defendant $8,400 in child support, $2,100 in
alimony (total $10,500 plus accrued interest).

Defendant paid

$750 leaving an unpaid arrearage of $9,750 (See plaintiff's
Exhibit 5 and $750 owed for January, 1992.)

No child support has

been paid since February, 1991.
b.

Defendant and his current wife both testified "He

would pay child support if his personal items were returned".
c.

Defendant further testified the plaintiff had

plenty of money and could sell one of her houses.

3
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d.

Defendant has not demonstrated good faith in

connection with attempting to pay his ongoing support
obligations.
e.

Defendant testified he was paying his new wife $500

per month rent in order to reside with her in a home she recently
purchased at 6808 Courtland Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah.
f.

Defendant is a veterinarian practicing in excess of

15 years and testified he earned $5.00 per hour in connection
with consultation he claimed he provided to the Osguthorpe Animal
Hospital-

Defendant had and has the means to pay child support.
g.

The credibility of the defendant and his present

wife is lacking.

Both refused to answer questions on the stand.

Both were evasive.

The defendant did not answer questions

truthfully.
h.

The defendant's failure to pay his support

obligations as previously ordered was done willfully, voluntarily
and with full knowledge of those obligations as previously
ordered by the Court.
6.

CONTEMPT.

The Court finds the defendant is in contempt

of this Court pursuant to Section 78-32-1(5) Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended), in that he has been disobedient of lawful
judgments, orders and processes of this Court.

The defendant had

the opportunity to have a full hearing and evidence has been
taken regarding that contempt.

The defendant has not answered

the questions put to him truthfully.

The Court specifically

finds that this is one of the most flagrant violations of the law
4
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as far as support of children that has come before this Court, in
that the defendant owes plaintiff in excess of $16,000 in unpaid
child support alone.

Defendant is further in contempt for his

failure to pay alimony and attorneys fees as previously ordered
by the Court.
7.

ATTORNEYS FEES.
a.

The defendant has paid nothing towards the

attorneys fees he was previously ordered to pay by this Court in
connection with the trial of this matter and his subsequent
appeal of this Court's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals.
b.

The plaintiff has incurred attorneys fees and costs

in connection with this hearing and will be required to pay those
fees.
c.

Plaintiff does not have the financial means to pay

d.

Plaintiff's counsel bills at the rate of $125 per

her fees.

hour.

That rate is consistent with rates charged in the

community for domestic relations work.

Plaintiff's counsel

expended in excess of 7 hours in connection with preparation for
and attendance at the hearing.

The rate charged and hours

expended are reasonable and necessary.

Plaintiff's counsel

requested an award of $875 in attorneys fees.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes the
following:

5
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

OBJECTIONS TO JANUARY 1991 PROPOSED ORDER,

Defendant's

Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Order and Judgments on
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of
Divorce, Determination of Attorneys Fees on Appeal, Contempt
Order and Sanctions and Other Relief filed in January, 1991, are
without merit and overruled and the Order has been signed as
proposed and without modification.
2.

DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S

RECOMMENDATIONS OF OCTOBER 8, 1991.

Defendant's Rejection of

Domestic Commissioner's Recommendation dated October 8, 1991 is
denied and the Recommendation is affirmed in all respects, except
as to plaintiff's claim for $180.53 in medical expenses which she
agreed to relinquish.
3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE.

Any personal property to be

exchanged under the original Decree of Divorce shall occur at the
residence of the plaintiff at 12:00 noon on January 11, 1992.
Plaintiff's counsel shall have a representative present.
Defendant shall attend and secure possession of any such property
to which he may be entitled.

Following that exchange the issue

of personal property shall be fully, finally and completely
resolved and neither shall raise any further claims to personal
property.
4.

UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES.

Plaintiff's

claims for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred
prior to January 4, 1991, have previously been reduced to
6

Judgment and, therefore, defendant's attempt to challenge those
expenses is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Plaintiff by

stipulation has waived her right to seek reimbursement from
defendant for the children's medical and dental expenses from
January 4, 1991 through September 25, 1991, the date which she
filed her motion seeking such reimbursement.
5.

JUDGMENT - UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.

Plaintiff

is granted a judgment against defendant in the sum of $9,750,
together with any accrued interest thereon, representing unpaid
child support and alimony from December 1990 through January
1992.

This judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for

unpaid child support and alimony previously entered by the Court.
6. JUDGMENT - ATTORNEYS FEES.

Plaintiff is granted judgment

against defendant in the sum of $875 for attorneys fees.

This

judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for attorneys
fees previously entered by the Court.
7.

SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT.

The Court imposes the following

sanctions on defendant for his contempt:
a.

The defendant is fined $200.

b.

The defendant is ordered to serve 30 days in the

Salt Lake County Jail.
c.

Pursuant to Section 78-32-12 Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended), the imprisonment is for his omission to
perform an act required by law, which he has the power and
ability to perform.

He shall continue to serve the time in jail

until he pays the child support as ordered by the Court.
7

d.

Pursuant to Section 78-32-12.1(5) Utah Code

Annotated, (1953 as amended), if the Court in its discretion
finds that the defendant would benefit from performing community
service, participating in workshop classes and/or individual
counselling to educate him about the importance of compliance
with the Court's Orders and the need to support his children,
then the Court may so order if it elects to do so.
e.

The jail sentence ordered above may be stayed for a

period of 6 days or until January 13, 1992.

If by that time

defendant has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the child support
arrearages reduced to judgment in 55 above.

If he fails to pay

the $5,000 by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to report
to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 noon, January 14, 1992.

If

he does not so report, a bench warrant will be issued for his
arrest.
f.

Further, in addition to and independent of the

requirements in the preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to plaintiff in a timely
fashion the sum of $900 per month ($600 regular child support and
$300 towards support arrearages).

Should defendant not make

these monthly payments as ordered, then the stay of the jail
sentence shall be lifted and he shall immediately commence
serving such sentence.

This $900 monthly payment shall continue

until all child support arrearages have been paid.

It shall be

in addition to the $150 monthly alimony payment he is required to
pay plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce.
8
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g.

Defendant may purge himself of his contempt as has

been found by the Court by paying the amounts required in 5s (e)
and (f) above.
DATED this J- \ day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT

.HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
/District Court Judge

Approved as to Substance and Form:
l
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Kasting

-6*£Rent M.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Date
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

\<

day of January, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law In Re: Hearing on Defendant's Objections to
Plaintiff's Written Order and Judgements Enforcement of Decree of
Divorce, Contempt Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and
Defendant's Objections to Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations
Related to Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt
Order, Sanctions, and Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and
Plaintiff's Request for Contempt Citation and accompanying
transcript of Ruling from bench, was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Jerry Osguthorpe
6808 Courtland Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Jerry Osguthorpe
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic
4696 South Highland Drive
Holladay, UT 84117
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Third Judicial District

JAN 2 4 1992
By.
U"ipa»y Clerk

KENT M. KASTING (1772)
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

Cl^lSU^

oooOooo
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff,
v.

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT IN RE:
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
WRITTEN ORDER AND JUDGMENTS,
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF
DIVORCE, CONTEMPT ORDER, ETC.
FILED JANUARY 11, 1991 AND
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER,
SANCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF
MADE OCTOBER 8, 1991 AND
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR
CONTEMPT CITATION
Civil No. 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

oooOooo
The Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written
Order and Judgements, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt
Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for
Contempt Citation came on for argument and evidentiary hearing on

k-%Cr>

Tuesday, January 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:30 a.m.
proceedings concluded at the hour of 4:30 p.m.

The

The plaintiff was

present and represented by her counsel Kent M. Kasting of Dart,
Adamson & Kasting.
himself pro se.

The defendant was present and represented

The parties presented testimony and documentary

evidence and argument in support of their respective positions.
Each party was sworn and testified under oath.

The Court

reviewed the file, the pleadings, motions, and other documents
before the Court and considers itself fully advised in the
premises.

The Court issued its ruling from the bench and has

made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Based upon the

foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

OBJECTIONS TO JANUARY 1991 PROPOSED ORDER.

Defendant's

Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Order and Judgments on
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of
Divorce, Determination of Attorneys Fees on Appeal, Contempt
Order and Sanctions and Other Relief filed in January, 1991, are
without merit and overruled and the Order has been signed as
proposed and without modification.
2.

DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S

RECOMMENDATIONS OF OCTOBER 8, 1991.

Defendant's Rejection of

Domestic Commissioner's Recommendation dated October 8, 1991 is
denied and the Recommendation is affirmed in all respects, except
as to plaintiff's claim for $180.53 in medical expenses which she
agreed to relinquish.

2

3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE,

Any personal property to be

exchanged under the original Decree of Divorce shall occur at the
residence of the plaintiff at 12:00 noon on January 11, 1992.
Plaintiff's counsel shall have a representative present.
Defendant shall attend and secure possession of any such property
to which he may be entitled.

Following that exchange the issue

of personal property shall be fully, finally and completely
resolved and neither shall raise any further claims to personal
property.
4.

UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES.

Plaintifffs

claims for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred
prior to January 4, 1991, have previously been reduced to
Judgment and, therefore, defendant's attempt to challenge those
expenses is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Plaintiff

has waived her right to seek reimbursement from defendant for the
children's medical and dental expenses from January 4, 1991
through September 25, 1991, the date which she filed her motion
seeking such reimbursement.
5.

JUDGMENT - UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.

Plaintiff

is granted a judgment against defendant in the sum of $9,750,
together with any accrued interest thereon, representing unpaid
child support and alimony from December 1990 through January
1992.

This judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for

unpaid child support and alimony previously entered by the Court.
6. JUDGMENT - ATTORNEYS FEES.

Plaintiff is granted judgment

against defendant in the sum of $875 for attorneys fees.
3
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This

judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for attorneys
fees previously entered by the Court.
7.

SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT.

The Court imposes the following

sanctions on defendant for his contempt:
a.

The defendant is fined $200.

b.

The defendant is ordered to serve 3 0 days in the

Salt Lake County Jail.
c.

Pursuant to Section 78-32-12 Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended), the imprisonment is for his omission to
perform an act required by law, which he has the power and
ability to perform.

He shall continue to serve the time in jail

until he pays the child support as ordered by the Court.
d.

Pursuant to Section 78-32-12.1(5) Utah Code

Annotated, (1953 as amended), if the Court in its discretion
finds that the defendant would benefit from performing community
service, participating in workshop classes and/or individual
counselling to educate him about the importance of compliance
with the Court's Orders and the need to support his children,
then the Court may so order if it elects to do so.
e.

The jail sentence ordered above may be stayed for a

period of 6 days or until January 13, 1992.

If by that time

defendant has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the child support
arrearages reduced to judgment in ^5 above.

If he fails to pay

the $5,000 by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to report
to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 noon, January 14, 1992.

4
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If

he does not so report, a bench warrant will be issued for his
arrest.
f.

Further, in addition to and independent of the

requirements in the preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to plaintiff in a timely
fashion the sum of $900 per month ($600 regular child support and
$3 00 towards support arrearages).

Should defendant not make

these monthly payments as ordered, then the stay of the jail
sentence shall be lifted and he shall immediately commence
serving such sentence.

This $900 monthly payment shall continue

until all child support arrearages have been paid.

It shall be

in addition to the $150 monthly alimony payment he is required to
pay plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce.
g.

Defendant may purge himself of his contempt as has

been found by the Court by paying the amounts required in fls (e)
and (f) above.
DATED this ) ~ "j day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT

/HONORABLE HOMER F . WILKINSON
/ D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Approved as to Substance and Form:

a.
Date

^*«_ Kent M. Kasting
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of January, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment In Re:
Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written Order
and Judgements Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt Order,
Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for
Citation and accompanying transcript of Ruling from bench was
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Jerry Osguthorpe
6808 Courtland Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Jerry Osguthorpe
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic
4696 South Highland Drive
Holladay, UT 84117
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SHARON A. DONOVAN. P C *
J O H N O SHEAFFER. JR

OT COUNSEL

E R I C P. LEE

J O H N T EVANS

SHANNON W CLARK
TALSO ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IS ~~Z STATE O r MONTANA
•ALSO ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IS " - £ STATE OP WASHINGTON

March 5, 1992

Dr. Jerry Osguthorpe
4850 South 2126 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Dr. Jerry Osguthorpe
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic
4696 South Highland Drive
Holladay, UT 84117
RE:

PC

OAVlO E ROSS II

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, Civil No. 874904967

Dear Dr. Osguthorpe:
I just received a telephone call from Jeannette and she
advised me that she had received a check from you for $500,
representing partial payment towards your February support
obligation. I have advised her to cash that check, inasmuch as she
needs those monies to support the children. That is not intended,
in any way to be a waiver on our part or a consent to any reduced
payment by you.
As you are aware, you are under Order to pay the sum of $900
per month towards child support, in addition to other ongoing
alimony obligation. If Jeannette has not received an additional
$400 check by close of business March 9, we will immediately ask
the Court for imposition of the jail sentence which the Court
stayed, provided you made the payments ordered by the Court. Please
govern yourself accordingly.
Very truly yours,

/en
KMK/kw
pc.
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Jeanette Osguthorpe
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KENT M. KASTING (1772)
of Counsel to
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v,

:

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT, ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND IMMEDIATE
IMPOSITION OF JAIL SENTENCE

:

Civil No. 874904967

:

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

oooOooo
COMES NOW the plaintiff and moves the court for the
following relief against defendant:
1.

For the immediate imposition on the defendant of

the 3 0 day jail sentence previously stayed by the Court.
2.

For an additional judgment of $1,400.00 against

the defendant representing unpaid child support for the months of
February, March, April and Mciy, 1992, plus any additional amounts
which accrue until this matter is heard.
3.

For an additional judgment against defendant in

the sum of $600,00 representing unpaid alimony for the months of
February, March and April of 1992, plus any additional amounts
which accrue until this matter is heard.
4.

For additional attorney's fees of not less than

$500.
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5.

For such other and further relief as may be

appropriate under the circumstances.
As grounds for this Motion plaintiff represents to the
Court as follows:
1.

On the 28th day of January, 1992, this Court

entered an Order against the defendant which provides in
pertinent part as follows:
e. The jail sentence ordered above may
be stayed for a period of 6 days or until
January 13, 1992- If by that time defendant
has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the
child support arrearages reduced to judgment
in 55 above. If he fails to pay the $5,000
by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to
report to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00
noon, January 14, 1992. If he does not so
report, a bench warrant will be issued for
his arrest.
f. Further, in addition to and
independent of the requirements in the
preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to
plaintiff in a timely fashion the sum of $900
per month ($600 regular child support and
$3 00 towards support arrearages). Should
defendant not make these monthly payments as
ordered, then the stay of the jail sentence
shall be lifted and he shall immediately
commence serving such sentence. This $900
monthly payment shall continue until all
child support arrearages have been paid. It
shall be in addition to the $150 monthly
alimony payment he is required to pay
plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce.
2.

On January 13, 1992 defendant paid to plaintiff

the $5,000 which he was ordered to pay as was provided above.
3.

Defendant has not paid the child support he was

ordered to pay as is more particularly set out below.

2
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Regular
Child Support

Month
February, 1992
March
April
May
TOTAL

Payments
on Arrearage
as Ordered

Total
Due

Total
Paid

$600
600
600
600

$300
300
300
300

$900
900
900
900

$500
500
-0-0-

$2,400

$1,200

$3,600

$1,000

Plaintiff is entitled to an additional judgment against the
defendant in the total sum of $1,400.00 ($100 February, $100
March, $600 April and $600 May).
4.

Defendant has not paid the $150 per month alimony

he was ordered to pay for th€> months of February, March, April
and May, 1992, and plaintiff is entitled to the additional
judgment of $600 representing those unpaid alimony installments.
5.

Plaintiff has been required to again retain the

services of an attorney (defendant has paid nothing toward any of
the numerous previous ciwards of attorney's fees made by the Court
against him) and a reasonable fee to be awarded in connection
with this matter is the* sum of not less than $500.
6.

Defendant has again wilfully and intentionally

violated the previous Orders of this Court and, therefore, is
once again in blatant contempt of this Court's previous Orders
and it is reasonable that he should be ordered to immediately
commence serving the entire 30 day jail sentence which the Court
had earlier imposed upon him but stayed conditioned upon his
complying with the payments the Court required him to make to the

A--44
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plaintiff and the Court should issue a bench warrant requiring
the defendant to commence serving that jail sentence forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for the relief requested
above and for such other and further relief as may be appropriate
under the circumstances.
DATED this

Z>0 — d a y of April, 1992.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

\^/KENT A. KASTING
A
Attorneys for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Jeannette C. Osguthorpe, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says:
That she is the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter
and has read the foregoing Plaintiff's Verified Motion for
Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail
Sentence and knows the contents thereof and that the same is true
of her own knowedge except as to those matters therein stated
upon information and belief, and, as to those matters, she
believes them to be true.

(Ly/UX

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
, 1992.

^•Q

day of

\<Sv^-o^rA^C^v

Notary Public

k-AJh
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

3 0 day of April, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail
Sentence was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Jerry Osguthorpe
6808 Courtland Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Jerry Osguthorpe
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic
4696 South Highland Drive
Holladay, UT 84117

A~AI~

000592

• - en

•bFP

Dl.iTq :

KENT M. KASTING (1772)
of counsel to
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
000O000

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff,
/ ^

NOTICE OF HEARING

v.
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,

: Civil No. 874904967

Defendant.

: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
000O000

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff's Verified Motion for
Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail
Sentence will come on for hearing on the 18th day of May, 1992,
at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of
the above-entitled court.
DATED this

7

day of May, 1992.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

Rent M. Kasti
Attorneys for Plaintiff

A^

nn05P.3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^X^Iday of May, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing was
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Jerry Osguthorpe
6808 Courtland Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Jerry Osguthorpe
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic
4696 South Highland Drive
Holladay, UT 84117

L^A&
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Third Judicial District

SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOo
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE
Civil No. 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

oOo
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

COMES NOW Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe, after being first duly
sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.

2.

I appeared before the above-entitled Court on May 18,

1992, on my Motion for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate
Imposition of Jail Sentence.
3.

Pursuant to the Court's ruling, the Court imposed a jail

sentence of thirty days for my ex-husband, Jerry Silver Osguthorpe,
if he did not pay $2,000.00 to me by May 26, 1992, at 12:00 o'clock
noon, and Bench Warrant would issue at that time.

4.

Further, the Court also ordered that the child support

through the month of June, 1992, would also need to be paid;
otherwise, a Bench Warrant would issue.
5.

I did not receive the $2,000.00 ordered to be paid by May

26, 1992, at 12:00 o'clock noon.
6.

I am asking that the Court issue a Bench Warrant,

pursuant to the Court's Order, to impress upon Defendant his
obligation

to meet the terms

of the Decree

of

Divorce

and

subsequent Orders.
DATED this

/

day of June, 1992.

ANETTE CRAWFORD^OSGUTHORP
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

^

7

day of June,

1992.

NOTARY PUBLIC
/
7
Residing in Salt Lake County, Ut,
Notary Public
SuftUktOty. Utah 841 c
My Commission Expires
^January IS, 1993
Slate 61 Utah

A K.n

000598

SHARON A. DONOVAN, 0901
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: 521-6383

(.t.-UJ .
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ans3as

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,

ORDER FINDING DEFENDANT
IN CONTEMPT AND IMPOSING
JAIL SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,

Civil No- 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, attorneys' fees and
immediate imposition of jail sentence came on regularly for
hearing on May 18, 1992 before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
one of the judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff
appearing in person and by and through Sharon A. Donovan on
behalf of Kent M. Kasting, and Defendant appearing pro se, and
the Court having heard evidence and during the proceedings having
received documentary evidence regarding Defendant's income,
Defendant's Exhibit Nos- 1 and 2.
Pursuant to such hearing an Order was entered by the Court
on June 5, 1992 finding the defendant in contempt and imposing a
jail sentence and judgment.

Because of procedural irregularities

-1-

the parties have stipulated that such Order should be withdrawn
and that a new Order should be issued in Order to allow the
defendant the opportunity to take appropriate action with
reference to such Order.
The Court considers itself very familiar with the file of
this case, having had numerous proceedings before this Court
prior to the above-referenced hearing.

The Court has carefully

listened to the profer and evidence of the parties and reviewed
prior testimony of the parties regarding prior imposition of jail
sentence and considers itself fully advised in the premises.
Based upon the foregoing, and the Court having made and entered
adequate and sufficient Findings of Fact, now, therefore, the
Court being fully advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Court finds that this matter has been before this

Court before, has been up to the Court of Appeals on one occasion
and that Court has sustained this Court, and the Court finds the
defendant's income, as he states, is just not realistic.
2.

The Court finds that the parties' children need to be

supported and Defendant has failed to meet his obligations,
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.
3.

The Court sustains its previous order.

The Court

further orders that Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Salt
Lake County Jail for a period of thirty days, and such longer
time as the Court deems fit to impose sentence, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §78-32-12, if the acts performed as ordered by
this Court are not fully complied with.
-2-

However, the Court will

stay its imposition of jail sentence, as long as the following
conditions are met: (a) the Court shall stay this Order until the
June 24, 1992, at 12:00 noon, at which time $3,050.00 shall be
paid by Defendant to Plaintiff to bring the delinquent child
support and alimony through June 1992 ($1,800.00 in child support
through June 1992, and alimony of $750.00 through June, 1992; and
attorneys1 fees of $500.00 for purpose of these proceedings).

If

the the $3,050.00 is not paid by June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon, a
bench warrant shall issue, unless the defendant submits himself
to the Salt Lake County Jail for incarceration.

(b) The Court

further orders that if the on-going child support and payment on
arrearages of $900.00 per month due on the 5th day of July,
1992 is not paid at that time, a bench warrant shall issue,
unless Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the Salt Lake
County Jail.

(c) If Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the

Salt Lake County Jail, he is ordered to inform this Court of
such, so that the necessary paperwork can be taken care of. JiS&j
Judgment shall enter against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff in
the amount of $1,800.00 in delinquent child support through June
1992; $750.00 in alimony through June 1992 and attorneys' fees of
$500.00 for purposes of these proceedings, for a total judgment
of $3,050.00.
DATED this

day of June, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

/

/HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Judge
-3-

Approved as to form:

Craig sUCook
Attorney for Defendant

-4-

n nno1 C

SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 13 3 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOo
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
WARRANT AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 874904967
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendant.
oOo
TO ANY CONSTABLE OR ANY SHERIFF WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH:
WHEREAS, it appearing that Jerry S. Osguthorpe, the Defendant
in the above-entitled action, has failed to obey previous orders of
this Court directing him to pay to Plaintiff the amount of $900.00
in delinquent child support through May, 1992; $600.00 in alimony
through May, 1992; and attorney's fees of $500.00, for a total
judgment of $2,000.00, and has further willfully and contemptuously
ignored prior orders of this Court; and
WHEREAS, the Court by its Order duly entered on the 3 ^
of

^}iwA,

day

, 1992, adjudged and decreed that Jerry S. Osguthorpe

was guilty of contempt of Court in failing to obey this Court's
orders;

OOQRiv

NOW, THEREFORE, in obedience to an Order of the Court made and
entered on the

S>

day of

, 1992, you are

commanded to take into your custody and commit to the Salt Lake
County Jail Jerry S. Osguthorpe and to confine him therein for a
period of thirty (30) days, or until such time as he shall purge
himself of this Court's finding of contempt by fully cooperating
with this Court's previous orders related to payment of the amount
of $900.00 in delinquent child support through May, 1992; $600.00
in alimony through May, 1992; and attorneyfs fees of $500.00, for
a

total

judgment

of

$2,000.00

to

Plaintiff,

Jeannette

C.

Osguthorpe, and his child support payment (including arrearages) of
$900.00

on

June

5,

1992, or until he

is otherwise

legally

discharged.
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to make due return of this Writ
within

days from the date hereof showing how you executed

the same.
DATED this

o

day of June, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

t=L

HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
SERVE DEFENDANT:
Jerry Osguthorpe
6808 Courtland Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Jerry Osguthorpe
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic
4 696 South Highland Drive
Holladay, Utah 84117

A J^/0

CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
Attorney for Defendant
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: 485-8123
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,

Civil No. 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.

Defendant Jerry Silver Osguthorpe by and through his
attorney hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the decision
entered by the lower court on June 19, 1992.
DATED this 24th day of June, 1992.

Crai^jl.
Cook
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to Sharon A.
Donovan, Attorney for Plaintiff, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 this 24th day of June, 1992.

L 3 InnU

Third

.-.; District

DEC 0 3 1992
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 13 30
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone:

Deputy Clerk

(801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOo
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT, ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil No. 874904967
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendant.
•oOo
Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and
Other Related Matters came on regularly for hearing on October 9,
1992, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, one of the Judges of
the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in person and by and
through her attorney, Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in
person and being represented by his attorney, Craig S. Cook, and
Plaintiff having been called as a witness on her Motion, and the
Court having heard the testimony and reviewed the pleadings and
argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Judgment shall enter against Defendant in the sum of

$1,625.00, which represents $1,100.00 unpaid child support through

A

S~

/7

the first half of October, 1992, and $525.00 alimony through the
first half of October, 1992.
2.
Utah

The Court finds that Defendant has filed an appeal in the

Court

of

Appeals

from

the

District

Court's

finding

of

contempt, has filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Utah
Supreme Court and further filed a Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus
against

the

Sherifffs

Department,

necessitating

action

and

attorney's fees on behalf of the Plaintiff.
The Court finds that pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §30-3-3, this
Court has the authority in divorce actions to grant fees as may be
appropriate in this matter.
judgment

of

$5,214.25

Based thereon, the Court orders a

against

Defendant

for

attorney's

fees

Plaintiff has reasonably incurred in defending the matters filed by
Defendant in the Court of Appeals, Supreme Court and Federal Court.
The Court further finds that the Court of Appeals specifically
remanded to the trial Court the award of Appellee's costs and
attorney's fees reasonably incurred in opposing the stay.

The

Court further finds that the judgment for attorney's fees in the
Supreme Court of $3,196.60 and the Federal Court of $620.70 shall
be awarded by way of judgment, unless the Federal Court or Supreme
Court specifically indicate that it was their intention not to
award attorney's fees to Plaintiff in this matter.

The relief

requested by Defendant in the Court of Appeals, Federal Court and
Supreme Court have all been denied by those Courts.

2

The Court

further finds that Defendant shall receive credit for time served
from the previous jail sentence in this matter.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff does not have the
ability to pay these fees and that these fees are reasonable, in
light of the actions of Defendant, and that Defendant has the
ability to pay said fees.

The Court further finds that these fees

are segregated as follows:
Court of Appeals
Supreme Court
Federal Court

$1,396.95
3,196.60
620.70

Total:

$5,214.25

The Court further finds that judgment shall enter against
Defendant in the sum of $300.00 for additional fees, for purposes
of

this

hearing,

for

$7,139.25.
DATED this v-3

a

total

judgment

for

this

^
day of November, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

llads

CRAIG \S}. COOK
Attorney for Defendant

i

/

^

hearing

of

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the nfcr

day of November, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Plaintiff's Motion
for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Craig S. Cook, Esq,
Attorney for Defendant
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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EXHIBIT.

£L

CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY ARREARAGES OWED BY JERRY OSGUTHORPE

Accrued
Child Support

Interest
.0083/mo.
(10%/Year)

Accrued
Alimony

Paid

Accrued
Arrearages

$600

$150

$600

$150.00

October

600

150

724.74

175.26

$1.24

November

600

150

600

325.26

2.70

December

600

150

647

428.26

3.55

January, 1989

600

150

750

428.26

3.55

February

600

150

750

428.26

3.55

March

600

150

375

803.26

6.66

April

600

150

375

1,178.26

9.78

May

600

150

375

1,553.26

12.89

June

600

150

375

1,928.26

16.00

July

600

150

375

2,3C3.26

19.12

August

600

150

375

2,678.26

22.23

September

600

150

375

3,053.26

25.34

October

600

150

375

3,428.26

28.45

November

600

150

375

3,803.26

31.57

December

600

150

375

4,178.26

34.6fi_• • • • • • • • • • •

Month
September, 1988

ff

PLAINTIFF'!
EXHIBIT
Z.

Accrued
Alimony

January, 1990

600

150

375

4,553.26

37.79

February

600

150

-0-

5,303.26

44.02

March

600

150

-0-

6,053.26

50.24

April

600

150

375

6,428.26

53.35

May

600

150

-0-

7,178.26

59.58

June

600

150

-0-

7,928.26

65.80

July

600

150

-0-

8,678.26

72.03

August

600 .

150

-0-

9,428.26

78.25

September

600

150

-0-

10,178.26

84.48

October

600

150

-0-

10,928.26

90.70

$15,600.00

$3,900.00

$8,571.74

$10,928.26

$857.55

Month

TOTALS

TOTAL ACCRUED ARREARAGES THROUGH OCTOBER, 1990
PLUS SIMPLE INTEREST ACCRUED THROUGH OCTOBER, 1990
TOTAL ARRREARAGES AND INTEREST DUE

Paid

$10,928.26
857.55
$11,785.81

Accrued
Arrearages

Interest
.0083/mo.
(10%/Year)

Accrued
Child Support

SUMMARY OF AMOUNTS OWED BY JERRY OSGUTHORPE
Child support and alimony arrearages
September, 1988 - October, 1990
(See Exhibit "A" attached to Motion)

$10,928.26

Interest on support/alimony arrearages
through October, 1990
(See calculations on Exhibit "A")

857.55

Credit to Jerry for net amount owed
by Jeanette to Jerry for uninsured
medical expenses of children
(See Exhibit «B" attached to Motion)

(56.59)

Credit to Jerry for repair costs to
his truck (See paragraph 3 of Order
and Judgment attached as Exhibit MCff)

(150.00)

Replacement value of VCR removed
by Jerry from Jeanette9s home
(Paragraph 13(A)(2) Decree of Divorce)

300.00

Attorney's fee judgment entered 3/1/89
(Paragraph 14 Decree of Divorce)

3,939.65

Interest on Attorney's fee judgment
@12% per annum through October, 1990
($39.40 per month simple interest x
20 months)

788.00

Judgments for car rental fees $320
and attorney's fees $200
(See Order, January 1989 at
Exhibit MCfl)

520.00

Interest on Judgments 1/89
§12% interest = $5.20 per month
for 21 months through October, 1990

109.20

SUBTOTAL
Appeal:

$17,236.07

Attorneys fees

3,820.00

Costs

590.50

TOTAL

Note:

$21,646.57

See next page for additional amounts accruing November,
1990.
1
I
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The following additional amounts will
be due by the end of November, 1990:
Child support $600; Alimony $150

$750.00

Interest on support/alimony arrearages
for November: $11,678.26 x .0083

9 6 ..93

Interest on attorneys fee judgment, Decree

3 9 ..40

Interest on car rental/atty fee judgments
1/89 Order
TOTAL ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS, November, 1990

1 3 ^ n yW-Hi&

5 .. 2 0

$891.53

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT ENTERED NOVEMBER, 1990
Child support and alimony arrearages
September, 1988 - October, 1990

$10,928.26

Interest on support/alimony arrearages
through October, 1990

857.55

Credit to Jerry for net amount owed
by Jeanette to Jerry for uninsured
medical expenses of children

(56.59)

Credit to Jerry for repair costs to
his truck

(150.00)

Replacement value of VCR removed
by Jerry from Jeanettef s home
(Paragraph 13(A)(2) Decree of Divorce)
Attorney's fee judgment entered 3/1/89
(Paragraph 14 Decree of Divorce)

300.00*
3,939.65

Interest on Attorney's fee judgment
@12% per annum through October, 1990
($39.40 per month simple interest x
20 months)

788.00

Judgments for car rental fees $320
and attorney's fees $200
(Order, January 1989

520.00

Interest on Judgments 1/89
@12% interest = $5.20 per month
for 21 months through October, 1990

109.2 0

SUBTOTAL
Appeal:

Attorney's fees
Costs

Amounts accruing November, 1990 (see attachment)
Credit to Jerry for skis sold at garage sale
TOTAL

$17,236.07
3,820.00
590.50
891.53
(100.00)
$22,438.10

*Note; Since entry of the judgment, defendant has returned the
VCR to plaintiff, and plaintiff is willing to credit $300 against
the judgment for that item.

The following additional amounts were
due by the end of November, 1990:
Child support $600; Alimony $150

$750.00

Interest on support/alimony arrearages
for November:

$11,678.26 x .0083

Interest on attorneyfs fee judgment, Decree
Interest on car rental/atty fee judgments
1/89 Order
TOTAL ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS, November, 199 0

96.93
39.40

5.20
$891.53

Accrued
Alimony

Paid

$600

$150

$375

January, 1991

600

150

February

600

150

March

600

150

-0-

April

600

150

-0-

May

600

150

-0-

June

600

150

-o-

July

600

150

-0-

August

600

150

-0-

September

600

150

-0-

October

600

150

-0-

November

600

150

-0-

December

600

150

-0-

$7 ,800

$1,950

Month

Accrued
Child Support

December, 1990

TOTALS

-0375

$750

TOTAL UNPAID ARREARAGES

$9,000

1
i
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Transcript of conversation
between Jerry and Jeanette Osguthorpe
Jerry:

"God, I thought you were going to have my ass in
jailf ha ha ha ha ha".

Jeanette:
Jerry:

Jeanette:

Jerry:
Jeanette:
Jerry:

Jeanette:
Jerry:
Jeanette:
Jerry:
Jeanette:
Jerry.

Jeanette:

"you know your in error1.
"Like hell, I'm not in error. Hell the judge
hasn't even signed that last order. Christ, your
attorney's taking you for a ride, Jeanette and
you're going to end up paying the whole god damn
bill for those attorneys. I'll tell you, you'll
end up paying the whole thing couse it's gonna
come out of the real assets that we have."
Well, I'll tell you what, what about these kids
that need new shoes, that have holes in their
shoes..."
By God, I'll take care of them,
Well why don't you?' They don's even dare ask."
If these kids need something you just send em
over, I'll take care of them, I'll take custody
of them. I'll do the whole god damn thing.
You're not taking custody of them, you just pay
your part and that will do the trick.
Yeah, thats right, that's right, because you
can't providefor them.
I've provided for them.
You can't provide for them. You can't take em ski
racing.
Yeah but they're happier
Yeah
You think you're a smart ass, don't ya? God,
I'll tell you, you're gonna find out, By God
it's like I told you at the start, if you want
joint custody of these kids, let's just sign
a joint custody and we'll go ahead and take care
of them.
Why don't you just pay your child support and
we won't have a problem.
I can live up to mv obliaations.

I^plJj^
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2
Jerry:

Jeanette:
Jerry:
Jeanette:
Jerry:
Jeanette:
Jerry:
Jeanette:
Jerry:
Jeanette:
Jerry:

Hell, I won't be paying any child support if
I have joint custody. I'll fulfill my obligation.
Hell, That's not an obligation. How come the ORS
(Office of Recovery Services) hasn't come after me
It's a court order and you are responsible.
How come the ORS hasn't come after me?
If it's a court order you are responsible for it.
You know what he told me during court, you heard
what he said, come on in and we'll change it.
No, He (Judge Wilkinson), said you were responsible for every single penny of it, Jerry.
No well..
Yes he did.
Well, where is it? Where is it? How you gonna get
it out of me, the money?
It doesn't matter how I'm gonna get it out of you,
If you can live with yourself ..
I can, I can

This occurred Tuesday evening 7:00 P.M. on Mar. 27, 1991
when Jerry came to return Jeff
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(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of
an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony:
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d» retention or removal of public officers; and
<e> those matters described in Subsections
(3 Ma* through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1992
78-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(11 The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3> The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law.
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be established by the appellate court administrator, and
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court.
78-2-'

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. Service o f sheriff t o court.
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986, 1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number ofjudges — Terms — Functions
— Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.
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78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal.
1986
78-2a-2. N u m b e r o f j u d g e s — T e r m s — Functions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court o f A p p e a l s jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review oi;
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other lo~'
cal agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under*:
Section 63-46a-12.1;

A-12-

<a appeals from the juvenile courts;
<d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
<e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony:
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(ji appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court
3> The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
•4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings
1992
7S-2a-4. Review of actions by S u p r e m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be b> petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
1986
7S-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in anv location within the state.
1986

Section
78-3-17.5.
78-3-18.
78-3-19.
78-3-20.
78-3-21.

78-3-22.
78-3-23.

78-3-24.
78-3-25.

78-3-26.

78-3-27.
78-3-28.
78-3-29.

78-3-30.
78-3-31.

78-3-1 to 78-3-2.

DISTRICT C O U R T S
lection
7S-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
7S-3-3.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir78-3-4.
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when court does not exist.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative
System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
Allocation of district court fees and
78-3-14.5.
fines.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.

A'l^

Repealed.

1971. 1981, 1988

78-3-3. T e r m of j u d g e s — V a c a n c y .
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the
district courts is six years, and commences on the
first Monday in January, next following the date of
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
1988
78-3-4.

CHAPTER 3

Application of savings accruing to
counties.
Judicial Administration Act — Short
title.
Purpose of act.
Definitions.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and responsibilities.
Assistants for administrator of the
courts — Appointment of trial court
executives.
Courts to provide information and statistical data to administrator of the
courts.
Annual judicial conference.
Repealed.
Presiding judge — Election — Term
— Compensation — Powers — Duties.
Duties of the clerk of the district
court.
Court commissioners — Qualifications
— Appointment — Functions governed by rule.

Jurisdiction — Transfer of c a s e s to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
w h e n court d o e s not exist.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the
district court, which are also within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district
court in multiple judge districts or the district court
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these
cases may be made upon the court's own motion or
upon the motion of either party for adjudication.
When an order is made transferring a case, the court
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been
originally commenced in the circuit court and any
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a decree of separate maintenance of
any state for three consecutive years without cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection
(3)(j) does not affect the liability of either party under
any provision for separate maintenance previously
granted.
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the
grounds of insanity unless: d) the defendant has
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authorities of this or another state prior to the commencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the
insanity of the defendant is incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and
complaint shall be served on the defendant in
person or by publication, as provided by the laws
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out
of this state, take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and make a defense as is
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the
interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as the courts and
judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the defendant resides in this state, upon notice, have
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or
have an examination of the defendant by two or
more competent physicians, to determine the
mental condition of the defendant. For this purpose either party may have leave from the court
to enter any asylum or institution where the defendant may be confined. The costs of court in
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband.
1953

30-3*3. Temporary alimony and suit money.
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk
a sum of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and to
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action.
1953

30-3-4.

P l e a d i n g s — Findings — Decree — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the cause.
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an
action in the judicial district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be
administered, a decree of divorce may not be
granted until both parties have attended a man-

30-3-5

datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and
have presented a certificate of course completion
to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one
of the parties, if it determines course attendance
and completion are not necessary, appropriate,
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties,
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be
held before the court or the court commissioner
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings
and decree upon the evidence.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend
the decree.
1992
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4.
30-3-5.

Repealed.

1990

Disposition of property — Maintenance
and health care of parties and children
— Division of debts — Court to h a v e
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties* separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

commission, or board from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate
court" means the court to which the appeal is taken.
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state
statute as to the appeal or review of an order of an administrative agency,
commission, board, or officer of the state which is inconsistent with one or
more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules
shall apply to such appeals or reviews.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as
established by law.
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah R. App. P.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, substituted
"trial court" for "district, juvenile, or circuit

court" in Subdivision (a) and "administrative
agency, commission, or board" for "tribunal" in
Subdivision (b).

TITLE II.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Kule 3. Appeal as ot right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify th§
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
16
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Rule 4

(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docketing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1,1992, inserted "and a
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certifi-

cation by the clerk that the bond has been
filed" and made minor stylistic changes in Subdivision (g).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Post-judgment motions.
In accord with fourth paragraph in bound
volume. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co..
182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. App. 1992).

ANALYSIS

Extension of time to appeal.
Post-judgment motions.
Cited.
Extension of time to appeal.
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v.
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Cited in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824
P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

17

A~1^

Rule 4

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for ail
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1^
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Attorney fees.
Cross-appeal.
Extension of time to appeal.
Filing of notice.
Filing with county clerk.

Final order or judgment.
Post-judgment motions.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timeliness of notice.
—Date of notice.
Cited.
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